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DISCRIMINATION AND OUTRAGE: THE MIGRATION FROM
CIVIL RIGHTS TO TORT LAW
MARTHA CHAMALLAS*
ABSTRACT

It is not always appreciated that proven discrimination on the
basis of race or sex may not amount to a tort and that even persistent
racialor sexual harassment may not be enough to qualify for tort
recovery. This Article explores the question of whether discriminatory and harassing conduct in the workplace is or should be
considered outrageous conduct, actionable under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In recent years, courts have
taken radicallydifferent approachesto the issue, from holding that
such claims are preempted to treating the infliction tort as a
reinforcement of civil rights principles. The dominant approach
views tort claims as mere "gap fillers" that should come into play

* C Martha Chamallas, Robert J. Lynn Chair in Law, The Ohio State University. Many
thanks to the participants at faculty workshops at the University of Denver, Wake Forest
University, and the University of California at Davis for their helpful feedback when I
presented earlier versions of this project. I particularly benefitted from comments and help
from Mike Green, Garry Jenkins, Lisa Pruitt, Beth Shane, Peter Shane, and Jennifer
Wriggins. I am also very grateful to Brett Taylor and Ben Rose for their research assistance.
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only in rare cases that do not fit comfortably underother recognized
theories of redress.
To place the currentapproachesin perspective and determine the
proper location for harassment claims, this Article analyzes the
respective domains of torts and civil rights, discussing the
prototypical harms and animating philosophies behind the two
regimes. It provides a history of the intentionalinfliction tort-with
particularemphasis on how early courts and commentators treated
issues of gender, race, and sexuality-and explains a new scholarly
turn toward universalism andprotectionthrough common law. The
Article identifies major innovations in the development of the hostile
environment claim to ascertain which basic principles could be
transportedto tort law. This Article concludes with a critiqueof the
"gap filler" approach and an argument for adapting the limited
migration approach of the new Restatement of Torts to allow
emerging norms from civil rights to influence the adjudicationof tort
claims.
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INTRODUCTION

What was once called the "new" tort of outrage or intentional
infliction of emotional distress is now well enough established to
consider it a permanent fixture of the common law of torts. Its main
features have recently been reaffirmed in the latest draft of the new
Restatement of Torts, including the key threshold requirement that
the plaintiff prove that the defendant's behavior is "extreme and
outrageous."' Despite its secure status, however, the tort still has
a curiously ambivalent quality, representing at once tort law's most
expansive protection of "pure" mental disturbance, yet combined
with a considerable reluctance on the part of courts to intrude upon
other areas of law or to interfere with what is perceived to be an
exercise of the defendant's legal rights.2
This ambivalence is particularly pronounced in the employment
context-in cases in which employees sue their employers, supervisors, and coworkers for intentional infliction of emotional distress
based on harassing, oppressive, or discriminatory behavior. In
many such cases, the employee also has a cause of action for a
violation of civil rights, under the Title VII federal statutory
scheme and parallel state statutory actions. 3 The most obvious
question arising from the juxtaposition of these two claims is
whether discriminatory and harassing conduct should also be
considered outrageous conduct and actionable in tort. For the
most part, however, the two types of claims have evolved separately, with courts engaging in a case-by-case screening of tort
claims for indicia of outrageousness,4 while developing elaborate
frameworks of proof for civil rights claims of harassment 5 and
1. Section 45 in the latest draft of the new Restatement provides: "An actor who by
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
disturbance to another is subject to liability for that emotional disturbance, and if the
emotional disturbance causes bodily harm, also for the bodily harm." RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 45 (Council Draft No. 6, 2006).

2. See infra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 102-21 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
5. In hostile environment cases, harassment plaintiffs generally must prove that the
conduct complained of was (1) unwelcome, (2) severe or pervasive, (3) based on sex or some
other prohibited basis, and (4) afforded a basis for employer responsibility for the acts of
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discrimination. 6 The particular focus of this Article is on the
intersection of torts and civil rights law, the place where outrage
and discrimination meet. It is part of a larger inquiry into the
degree to which the concepts and values of civil rights law have
migrated or can be expected to migrate into tort law.
From a practical perspective, the migration of legal concepts and
values from civil rights to torts is important because it opens up an
additional avenue for employees to seek redress for workplace
injuries7 and exposes employers in some cases to greater amounts
of damages. The advantage of torts to plaintiffs is that it offers the
prospect of uncapped compensatory and punitive damages, in
contrast to federal Title VII law that imposes caps on such
damages' and state civil rights laws with similar restrictions.9
Indeed, a recent empirical study of sexual harassment cases conducted by Professor Catherine Sharkey concluded that including
state law claims for harassment has had the effect of increasing

supervisors or coworkers. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752-54, 763
(1998).
6. Under Title VII, plaintiffs are allowed to proceed under either a disparate treatment
(intentional discrimination) or a disparate impact (unintentional discrimination) theory. The
courts have developed a number of specialized frameworks to govern litigation under each
theory. HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
AND PRACTICE 164-259 (2d ed. 2004).
7. Because the statute of limitations for filing tort claims for intentional infliction is
somewhat longer than for statutory civil rights claims, in some cases, tort may be the only
remedy available. The most common statutes of limitations for intentional infliction claims
are two or three years. Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121,
139 (2001). Title VII requires plaintiffs to file suit within either 180 or 300 days of the
discriminatory act, depending on the state. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2000).
8. Title VII places a total cap on the amount of compensatory and punitive damages at
between $50,000 and $300,000, depending on the size of the employer. 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(b)(3) (2000).
9. This advantage, however, depends on whether the state has capped noneconomic
damages in tort actions as well. Most states have imposed caps on noneconomic
compensatory damages only in medical malpractice actions. Catherine M. Sharkey,
UnintendedConsequences of MedicalMalpracticeDamages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 app.
at 496-500 (2005). An even greater number of states have caps on punitive damages in all
tort cases. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Dissecting Damages:An Empirical Exploration of
Sexual HarassmentAwards, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 42 (2006) [hereinafter Sharkey,
DissectingDamages]. When caps exist for common law torts, they are generally more liberal
than caps under Title VII. Id. Fewer than half the states authorize recovery of punitive
damages under state civil rights acts. See JOHN F. BUCKLEY IV & RONALD M. GREEN, STATE
BY STATE GUIDE TO HUMAN RESOURCES LAW §§ 2-102 to -112 tbls. 2.4-3 (2006).
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awards for sexual harassment plaintiffs, despite limitations on
damages under federal law.' °
Beyond this immediate practical impact, however, the degree of
migration is also a significant index of cultural transformation, a
marker of whether new understandings of categories such as
"sexual harassment" and "hostile environment" have become
mainstream and have altered traditional thinking about the proper
domain of tort law. As one leading commentator on the subject has
stated, when a court declares that a recurring type of conduct is
"outrageous[,] ... it is making an official determination of the moral
seriousness of that conduct.""
That civil rights would migrate from its "home" in constitutional
and antidiscrimination law into other areas of law, such as tort law,
should not be surprising. The antidiscrimination principle-the
principle that rejects legal expressions of racism, sexism, and
similar ideologies 2 is a widely shared cultural norm that we
would expect to see reinforced in private law, particularly in the
articulation of duties owed by persons who are in a position to
inflict serious harm and to restrict the opportunities and potential
of others. Additionally, in the last thirty years the harms of
discrimination and harassment have been extensively catalogued
and theorized, both in the criminal law debate over "hate" crimes 3
and through the development of various theories of discrimination
under the U.S. Constitution, 4 Title VII, 15 and related statutes.
What has emerged is a multifaceted injury-with both a personal
and social dimension-that can more readily be transported and
absorbed into preexisting bodies of law.

10. Sharkey, DissectingDamages, supra note 9, at 4-5.
11. Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness:Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 42, 53 (1982).
12. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 1 (1996).
13. See generally Lu-in Wang, The Transforming Power of "Hate" Social Cognition
Theory and the Harmsof Bias-relatedCrime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 108-28 (1997) (discussing
psychological and social consequences of hate crimes).
14. See generally R.A. Lenhardt, Understandingthe Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality
in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 803, 836-48 (2004) (cataloguing harms of racial stigma on
groups and individuals).
15. See generally Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudenceof Sexual Harassment,83
CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1205-20 (1998) (discussing multiple harms of sexual harassment).

2120

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:2115

Predictably, however, given the strong countervailing social
forces, the migration from civil rights to torts has also been
vigorously resisted. 6 A variety of legal and policy arguments from
preemption to renewed demands for legal recognition of "management prerogative" have been deployed to keep civil rights in its
place and preserve tort law for more traditionally framed dignitary
harms divorced from considerations of equality. The contemporary
legal picture of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
reflects this struggle. There is considerable variation in treatment
among the states, ranging from hefty migration in New Jersey 7 to
a cutoff of tort claims in Iowa through preemption.'" For some
courts, the tort is treated as an independent cause of action that
provides mutual reinforcement for civil rights and other important
public policies.' 9 For other courts, it is a mere "gap filler" that
generally should come into play only when no other legal remedy is
available.2"
This Article traces the migration and influence of civil rights on
the development of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress in the employment context. It builds upon a rich literature
on the subject that has sprung up recently, calling for a variety of
specific reforms, including changes in the courts' approach to outrageousness, more expansive common law and statutory protection
against "bullying,"2 ' and the development of a common law of the
workplace." Although I start from the premise that some migration
is desirable and that the development of Title VII harassment law
is generally positive, my goal in this Article is principally descriptive. My interest lies in looking more deeply into the domain of tort
law to see just how much has changed in the courts' basic views on
outrage and its connection to discrimination in the generation or so
16. See infra notes 53-84, 102-21 and accompanying text.
17. See Taylor v. Metzer, 706 A.2d 685, 700 (N.J. 1998) (allowing tort suit based on
alleged use of a racial epithet to proceed).
18. See Greenland v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Iowa 1993) (holding that civil
rights statutes preempted tort claim based on sexual harassment).
19. See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 53-74, 81-84 and accompanying text.
21. See David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of 'Workplace Bullying" and the Need for
Status-blind Hostile Work Environment Protection,88 GEO. L.J. 475, 477-78 (2000).
22. See William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace,
69 BROOK. L. REv. 91, 96 (2003).
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that has elapsed since the new tort became established and civil
rights law matured into its current state.
Since its inception, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress has been knee-deep in issues relating to gender, sexuality,
and personal morality. 23 This Article describes how the tort was
created in part to provide protection for vulnerable persons--often
women-when older causes of action, notably assault and slander,
failed to capture and respond to their injuries.2 4 It chronicles the
ebb and flow of feminist criticism of, and attraction to, the tort,
reflecting the perennial struggle to find the right "location" for
claims of sexual exploitation and demands for recognition of sexual
autonomy." The imprint of race is less visible in the history of the
tort. In its early days, the tort principally provided a vehicle for
protecting white racial privilege by allowing claims of white
plaintiffs who alleged injury arising from contacts with blacks that
they found objectionable.2 6 After the civil rights era, the tort was
deployed successfully by black plaintiffs in cases involving racial
harassment2" or threats of racial violence.2"
These investigations into the treatment of gender and race
through the intentional infliction tort suggest that the migration
of civil rights into tort law has so far been limited and erratic,
although aggressive attempts to abruptly halt the migration have
also faltered. Although the courts have controlled the migration
process, they have not often reflected on the normative significance
of holding that discriminatory conduct does or does not amount to
a tort. Whether an equality gloss can be placed on the tort concept
of outrageousness is the critical open question at the heart of many
of the recent proposals for change. The Article concludes with my
reflections and hopes for this process.

23. See infra Parts I, III.
24. See infra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See O'Connor v. Dallas Cotton Exch., 153 S.W.2d 266, 267-68 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
(white female plaintiff recovered for being compelled to ride with blacks on an elevator); Gulf,
C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Luther, 90 S.W. 44, 46-48 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905) (white female plaintiff
recovered for being insulted by a black female attendant).
27. See Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 217-19 (Cal. 1970).
28. Ruiz v. Bertolotti, 236 N.Y.S.2d 854, 855-56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962) (Puerto Rican
plaintiffs threatened with bodily harm if they moved into a neighborhood).
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Part I of this Article sets the framework for discussing the
intersection of civil rights and torts and, more specifically, the
migration of civil rights concepts and values into the intentional
infliction tort in employment cases. It explains how most courts
handle intentional infliction claims centered on workplace harassment and discrimination, focusing on the high bar often set for
meeting the standard of outrageousness and the still-raging debate
over whether tort claims should be preempted, leaving only civil
rights or workers' compensation remedies. The range of judicial
responses is discussed, culminating in an analysis of the two
competing visions of the tort as either a "mutual reinforcement" of
civil rights or a "gap filler" that offers a remedy only when there is
no alternative basis for suit.
To understand why courts might disagree about the proper
location for cases alleging injuries from employment discrimination,
Part II examines the respective domains of tort and civil rights,
discussing the prototypical harms and animating philosophies
behind the two legal regimes. Part II concludes with a catalogue of
the various harms of discrimination to explain why it has not been
easy to position discrimination claims-principally those involving
sexual and other forms of workplace harassment-solely on one side
of the divide.
Part III looks into the history of the intentional infliction tort
prior to the development of modern civil rights law, that is, before
the 1970s. The history highlights cases implicating issues of gender,
race, or social inequality, and develops a picture of the kinds of
behavior courts were most likely to regard as outrageous. In this
formative period, the intentional infliction tort was viewed as filling
an important gap or deficiency within tort law to provide a remedy
for serious nonphysical injury caused by behavior that seemed
unquestionably immoral to judges." The history discusses how the
highly influential academic commentary of the period, even more
so than the courts, was careful to protect male sexual initiative
from the reach of the new tort, as typified by Professor Magruder's

29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 45 cmt. a (Council Draft No. 6, 2006) ("The outrage tort originated as a catchall to permit
recovery when an existing tort claim was unavailable but in the narrow instances when an
actor's conduct exceeded all permissible bounds of a civilized society.").
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notorious oft-quoted assertion "that there is no harm in asking."30
It analyzes early claims implicating race to chart how courts were
inclined to protect white racial pride and privilege, while refusing
to regard the discriminatory treatment of African Americans as
outrageous.
Part IV explores the nature of reform of tort law after civil rights.
It first analyzes feminist arguments for relocating claims of
sexualized injury within the framework of civil rights through new
definitions of sex-based discrimination and a status-based approach
to legal remedies.3 1 As an example of a tort-based, universalist
approach to discriminatory harm, Part IV provides a retrospective
view of the now-classic article by Professor Regina Austin imagining an equality-centered intentional infliction tort that would reach
indignities caused by subordination in the workplace.3 2
Part IV then canvasses developments in civil rights law most
relevant to the intentional infliction claim. In particular, it
evaluates the Title VII concepts of "sexual harassment" and "hostile
environment" to see just which innovations might be exported to
tort law. It explores the doctrinal limitations of Title VII law as it
has matured in the last two decades that have prompted some
scholars to press for a migration of discrimination claims to tort
law.3 3 It discusses tort law's potential to reach forms of
bias-including same-sex harassment, multidimensional discrimination, and bias directed at persons because of how they perform
their identity-not covered by current civil rights law. The Part
ends with a sober reminder of the limited capacity of law-whether

30. Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbancein the Law of Torts, 49 HARV.
L. REv. 1033, 1055 (1936).
31. The most prominent case for relocating claims for sexualized injuries out of tort law
and into civil rights law was made by Catharine A. MacKinnon in her influential book,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 172-73 (1979).
32. Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional
Infliction of EmotionalDistress, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1, 5 (1988).
33. See Brady Coleman, Pragmatism'sInsult: The GrowingInterdisciplinaryChallenge
to American Harassment Jurisprudence,8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POLY J. 239, 251-52 (2004);
Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of
Workplace Harassment,88 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (1999); Catherine L. Fisk, Humiliationat Work, 8
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 73, 83-84 (2001); Debra Parkes, Targeting Workplace
Harassment in Quebec: On Exporting a New Legislative Agenda, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y
J. 423, 432-33 (2004).
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torts or civil rights-to produce changes "on the ground" and to
transform the meaning of behavior in everyday life.
The Article concludes with my reflections on the migration
process. Part V discusses the limited migration position taken by
the Third Restatement of Torts and what it might mean for the
prospects for migration in the future. It offers a critique of the
dominant "gap filler" approach to the infliction tort and gives
suggestions for reshaping the tort concept of "outrage" by borrowing
innovations from civil rights law. I speculate whether the infliction
tort can be refashioned to capture the equality dimension of dignity
and dignitary harms and bring civil rights into the mainstream of
private law.
34
I. THE INTERSECTION OF TORTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS

The connection between tort law-the premier system designed
to protect against civil wrongs-and civil rights is an undertheorized topic that only sporadically attracts the attention of
scholars.3 ' Nonlawyers may be surprised to learn that proven
discrimination on the basis of race or sex does not always amount
to a tort and that even persistent racial or sexual harassment may
not be enough to qualify for a tort recovery. Conversely, law
students often presume incorrectly that the domains of tort and
civil rights are mutually exclusive, in line with the discrete
categories assigned to those subjects in the law school curriculum.
And because of the complexity of the current state of the law, even
experts in the two areas cannot adequately capture the connection
in a few simple propositions or statements about respective scope.
Part of the disconnect between torts and civil rights stems from
the fact that the older intentional tort causes of action-particularly
34. Part I of this Article appeared in an earlier form as an essay in Martha Chamallas,
Shifting Sands of Federalism:Civil Rights and Tort Claims in the Employment Context, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 697, 702-12 (2006).
35. Regarding the controversy over hate speech, see, for example, JUDITH BUTLER,
EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 52-54(1997); Richard Delgado, Words

that Wound: A Tort Action for RacialInsults,Epithets, and Name-calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 133, 134 (1982); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 435-37; and Mari J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Consideringthe Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2321
(1989).
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battery, assault, and defamation-were designed to address harms
far removed from the injuries caused by discrimination and are illsuited to fit the prototypical bias injury. Thus, for example,
although some forms of sexual harassment include offensive
touchings and are actionable in tort as batteries,3 6 many other cases
of harassment involve either no physical contact or physical
contacts that the defendant asserts were not intentionally offensive
or harmful.3 7 Similarly, although the tort of assault protects against
conduct that interferes with a plaintiffs mental equilibrium, it
requires proof of apprehension of imminent physical contact 38 and,
as a practical matter, is limited to physical forms of harassment.
Moreover, for bias-centered claims caused by a defendant's
negligence, strict limitations have often been placed on recovery for
pure emotional or economic harms, again making it difficult to
reach discriminatory conduct that does not produce a physical
injury.39
For quite some time, the best candidate for situating a tort claim
for discriminatory behavior has been the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The influential section 46 of the
Second Restatement of Torts required only four elements of proof to
establish a claim: (1) intent or recklessness, (2) extreme and
outrageous conduct, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional
distress. 4' The latest version of the new Restatement reiterates the
four required elements and reaffirms that a finding of "outrageousness" is the centerpiece of the intentional infliction claim. 41 The
commentary to the latest draft of the Restatement acknowledges
36. See, e.g., Burns v. Mayer, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1269-70 (D. Nev. 2001) (finding that
snapping the plaintiffs bra strap, putting hands on her waist, and hitting her buttocks
constituted harassment and battery); Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1343 (Wyo. 1997)
(considering physical touchings as part of pattern of harassing conduct).
37. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1993) (noting that the
plaintiffs supervisor had repeatedly disparaged women and made unwelcome, sexually
suggestive comments).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21(1) (1965).
39. For example, many states that permit recovery of negligent infliction of emotional
distress still require plaintiffs to prove that the distress resulted in physical injury or
produced physical manifestations. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 308, at 836-39

(2000).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 45
(Council Draft No. 6, 2006).
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that a finding of outrageousness is "as much a normative judgment
as it is a finding of historical fact ' 42 and accepts that proof of
''outrageousness" is the most potent element in screening cases and
does "most of the important normative work. 4 3
Tellingly, the Restatements have never attempted to provide a
definition of "outrageous" conduct. The concept that emerges from
the case law is extremely fluid and invariably responds to changing
cultural sensibilities. 4 All agree that liability is reserved only for
the worst cases. The boilerplate language from the Restatement
commentary often recited by the courts is that, to qualify as
outrageous, the conduct in question must be such as "to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community."4 5 The most concrete
guidance offered by the Restatement is that courts have been more
willing to declare conduct outrageous if it exploits an existing power
disparity between the parties, for example, in cases in which the
defendant abuses the authority of his position or46knowingly takes
advantage of a vulnerable or powerless plaintiff.
At first blush, the intentional infliction tort might seem well
suited to capture harassment and other discriminatory harms
because it dispenses with the need to prove physical harm or fear
of physical harm and goes beyond cases of malice or ill will,
covering situations in which defendants either desire or know to
a substantial certainty that distress will result from their
actions-the rather broad "intent" standard in tort law 4 7-or
disregard the high probability that such distress will occur-the
42. Id. § 45 cmt. f.
43. Id. § 45 reporter's note cmt. c.
44. See infra notes 189-287 and accompanying text.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). The commentary also added this
oft-cited unhelpful piece of advice to identify outrageous conduct: "Generally, the case is one
in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his
resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!"' Id.
46. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmts. e, f. Professor Dobbs has identified
four "markers" of outrage: (1) abusing a position of dominance, (2) taking advantage of a
plaintiff known to be vulnerable, (3) repeating offensive acts in situations in which plaintiff
cannot avoid harm, and (4) committing or threatening violence or serious economic harm to
a person or property of special interest to the plaintiff. DOBBS, supranote 39, § 304, at 827.
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (providing that "intent" means "that the
actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it").
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"recklessness" standard.4" Equally as important, the intentional
infliction tort seems tailor made to respond to an abusive course of
conduct over a period of time, rather than simply to discrete
tortious acts.49 In this sense, it looks like a tort uniquely capable of
comprehending the kind of pervasive and repeated harassment that
characterizes a hostile workplace environment.
Despite these features, however, in most jurisdictions proof of
discriminatory workplace harassment-the kind of employment
discrimination that looks most like a tort-is not sufficient to
guarantee tort recovery. For the most part, courts do not equate
discrimination with outrageous conduct. With the notable exception
of California,5" courts have refused to classify discrimination as per
se outrageous and have even hesitated to declare the "severe" or
"pervasive" harassment required to prove a Title VII claim of
hostile environment sufficient to satisfy the threshold tort requirement of "extreme and outrageous" conduct. 5 The bar of outrageousness is occasionally set so high that even the plaintiff who succeeds
in proving a constructive discharge, with evidence that working
conditions were so "intolerable" that a reasonable person would
have quit the job, may not be confident of recovery in tort.5 2

48. See id. § 500 (providing that "reckless" conduct involves "knowing or having reason
to know of facts" that "would lead a reasonable man to realize" that his conduct created a
"risk ...
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent").
49. See Jennifer B. Wriggins, Domestic Violence in the First-yearTorts Curriculum, 54
J. LEGAL EDUC. 511, 518-19 (2004) (making a similar argument with respect to domestic
violence and the intentional infliction tort).
50. Intermediate appellate courts in California have taken the position that harassment
that violates the state's antidiscrimination laws is per se outrageous and gives rise to a tort
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula
Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) ("Given an employee's fundamental, civil
right to a discrimination free work environment, by its very nature, sexual harassment in
the work place is outrageous conduct as it exceeds all bounds of decency usually tolerated by
a decent society." (citations omitted)); see also Toran v. Jones, No. H025568, 2003 Cal. App.
LEXIS 4887, at **14-18 (Cal. Ct. App. May 19, 2003) (holding that discrimination based on
disability and denial of medical leave is per se outrageous); Kovatch v. Cal. Cas. Mgmt. Co.,
77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217, 230-31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that harassment based on sexual
orientation is per se outrageous).
51. See, e.g., Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 748, 753-55 (Pa. 1998) (holding that a
sexually hostile work environment is not outrageous).
52. See Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1991) (providing dicta
in an age discrimination case indicating that constructive discharge should be regarded as
"outrageous" conduct only in "the most unusual cases").
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A fairly typical case is Pucci v. USAIR,5 3 a sexual harassment
case decided by a federal district court in Florida after removal from
state court on diversity grounds. Valerie Pucci was the only woman
employed on her shift at the airline's maintenance department in
Orlando. 54 At an initial meeting with her supervisor, Pucci was
warned that she would be exposed to profanity because "USAIR's
employees did not know how to act around female coworkers. 55 For
approximately ten months, she was subjected to a persistent
campaign of harassment against her by her male coworkers. 6 Much
of the harassment consisted of repeatedly placing pornographic
pictures on and inside her desk in her absence, even though her
work area was just outside the supervisor's office.57 The court's
opinion recites five such separate incidents.5 After each incident,
Pucci complained to a supervisor, but nothing was ever done to
discover or punish those responsible.5 9 Instead, Pucci was told by
USAIR's manager that she was to blame and that she had been
warned to expect "industrial language" when working with a group
of men.6 ° At times the harassment also took a more personal turn.
For example, Pucci found a note on the attendance board stating
that a coworker was "Sick-Due to lack of blow jobs from Valerie"
and a homemade card placed on her desk stating that "Val's Weight
Soars to 200 Lbs!"61 She recounted that she overheard one employee

53. 940 F. Supp. 305 (M.D. Fla. 1996). Courts in Arkansas, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan,
New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas also apply a very strict standard which
bars most intentional infliction claims in the employment context. See Hartliep v. McNeilab,
Inc., 83 F.3d 767, 777 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying Michigan law); Greenwood v. Delphi Auto.
Sys. Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1073 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Arbabi v. Fred Meyers, Inc., 205 F.
Supp. 2d 462,466 (D. Md. 2002); Hollomon v. Keadle, 931 S.W.2d 413,415 (Ark. 1996); Aaron
v. Werne, 807 P.2d 161 (Kan. 1991) (unpublished table decision); McIntyre v. Manhattan
Ford, Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d 167, 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Miner v. Mid-Am.
Door Co., 68 P.3d 212, 223 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002); Hoy, 720 A.2d at 754; Hoffmann-La Roche
Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004).
54. Pucci, 940 F. Supp. at 307.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 307-08.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 308.
61. Id. at 307-08.
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telling another that he had been sent in to see her and jokingly
said, "What are we suppose [sic] to do? Stick her then lick her?"6 2
Pucci documented that her harassment caused her to suffer in
and outside of work.63 To cut down on the barrage of pornography,
she was moved into a secured office, which was kept locked when
not in use and which Pucci described as "a cage, and not an office."64
The stress reached a point that Pucci sought treatment from a
physician, who prescribed two drugs for her anxiety and depression
and finally admitted her on an outpatient basis for all-day treatment at a hospital for two consecutive weeks. 5 Because of the
numerous incidents, Pucci even feared that her coworkers would
attack or stalk her, and claimed that her fear caused her to fall
down the stairs one day when leaving work.6 6 Ultimately, her
request to transfer out of Orlando was granted, a move she claimed
proved to be disruptive for her marriage and the lives of her three
children.6 7
In many respects, Pucci is a classic case of hostile environment
sexual harassment. There was no dispute that she was targeted for
harassment because she was the only woman in a male-dominated
job. Her harassment was persistent, sexualized, and calculated to
make her feel ostracized and humiliated. When she complained to
management, the problem was not corrected, but in fact was made
worse by the belief that harassment was something that she should
endure as part of the job.6" Lastly, the harassment caused her a
variety of damages, including medical bills, mental distress, and
employment-related expenses." Pucci's complaint summed up her
case with allegations "that USAIR created an extraordinarily
hostile, sexually-poisoned work atmosphere ... and that USAIR
purposely exposed [her] to vile acts of depravity, rather than take
simple and cost-effective measures to stop the harassment."7

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 308.
Id.

67. Id.
68. Id.

69. Id.
70. Id. at 307.

2130

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:2115

It is telling that Pucci's complaint of intentional infliction of
emotional distress did not even survive a motion to dismiss.' For
the Florida trial court, the distinction between discriminatory
harassment and outrageous conduct was so great that it had little
difficulty reciting the boilerplate limitations on recovery for
intentional infliction and moving on to the next issue in the case. 2
Quoting commentary to the Second Restatement of Torts, the court
simply concluded that, although the conduct directed at Pucci was
"not civilized behavior," her harassment was not "so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." 3 It instead presumably fell into the nonactionable realm of
"mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions,
or other trivialities."7 4
It should be pointed out that the court never reached the issue of
vicarious liability of USAIR for the acts of the harassers in this
case. 5 Instead, by knocking out the case for failure to prove
"outrageous" conduct, the court implied that Pucci would have lost
the case even if she had known the identity of her harassers and
sued them individually.76 As a practical matter, this point is
important when analyzing the intersection of tort and civil rights
because individual supervisors and coworkers generally may not be
sued under Title VII 77 or under many of the parallel state civil
71. See id. at 309.
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278-79 (Fla. 1985)).
74. Id. (quoting Scheller v. Am. Med. Int'l, Inc., 502 So. 2d 1268, 1271 (Fla. App. 1987)).
75. Wbether an employer will likely be held vicariously liable for harassment by a
supervisor in a tort action for intentional infliction also depends on the jurisdiction. Some
courts apply a liberal standard and impose liability if the alleged acts took place on the job
and resulted from or were an outgrowth of employment duties. See Harris v. Pameco Corp.,
12 P.3d 524, 530 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). Other courts apply a restrictive standard, refusing to
impose vicarious liability if the supervisor was acting for purely personal reasons
disconnected from the employer's business. See Travis Pruitt & Assocs., P.C. v. Hooper, 625
S.E.2d 445, 448 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). The liberal standard focuses on the overall context of the
supervisor's action, whereas the restrictive standard places emphasis on the supervisor's
motivation.
76. See Pucci, 940 F. Supp. at 309.
77. See, e.g., Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180-81 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding
that individual employees are not liable under Title VII); Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233,
241 (5th Cir. 1998) (accord); Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir. 1995) (accord);
Tomka v. Seller Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995) (accord); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l
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rights acts.78 However, no such restriction exists under tort law,
which permits suits against both individual actors and employers.7"
Thus, the tort claim is often the only way to pursue a claim against
the harasser individually, and plaintiffs, if defeated for lack of proof
of outrageousness, may have no other legal recourse against
individual harassers.'0
As Pucci illustrates, many courts need something more than
discrimination or even persistent harassment to establish outrageousness in the employment context. To date, however, most
courts have been unable to articulate precisely what constitutes
that extra element.8 ' For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court rejected a lower court's view that a showing of retaliation, in
Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993) (accord). But see Wyss v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 24
F. Supp. 2d 202, 207,209-10 (D.R.I. 1998) (holding an individual supervisor liable under Title
VII and the Rhode Island fair employment statute).
78. See, e.g., Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1333, 1343-47 (Cal. 1998) (holding that a supervisor
may not be sued individually for discrimination under the state fair employment and housing
act).
79. See, e.g., White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.2d 1205, 1207 (La. 1991) (involving a claim
against both employer and supervisor).
80. The choice of defendant may also affect the all-important issue of whether liability
insurance will be available to cover the claim. Employers have increasingly purchased
Employment Practices Liability Insurance (EPLI) to cover claims of discrimination, sexual
harassment, or wrongful discharge. These policies are being expanded to cover claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Nancy H. Van der Veer, Note and
Commentary, Employment PracticesLiability Insurance: Are EPLI Policies a License To
Discriminate?Or Are They a Necessary Reality Check for Employers?, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 173,
190 (2005). If the employer is held vicariously liable for such conduct, most EPLI policies will
generally cover the claim, if permitted under state law. James B. Dolan, Jr., The Growing
Significanceof Employment PracticesLiability Insurance,34 BRIEF 30, 34 (2005). Only some
policies, however, cover individual supervisors who are sued for harassment. There is greater
resistance to allowing such intentional wrongdoers to insure against personal liability. One
observer notes that because EPLI policies will generally cover defense costs, even if the
insurer does not have to indemnify the policy holder, "[u]nfortunately for many employees
subjected to discrimination on the job, the result of EPLI coverage will be that claims will be
defended more vigorously without providing a pool of funds for paying those claims that
succeed." Jan W. Henkel, Discriminationby Supervisors:PersonalLiability Under Federal
Employment DiscriminationStatutes, 49 FLA. L. REV. 767, 797 n.184 (1997).
81. Some courts, while acknowledging that each claim must be decided on its own merits,
have listed aggravating factors that have generally been present in "outrageous" cases of
harassment. See Guthrie v. Conroy, 567 S.E.2d 403, 409 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (listing as
indicia of outrageousness "an unfair power relationship between defendant and plaintiff;
explicitly obscene or 'X-rated' language; sexual advances towards plaintiff; statements
expressing desire to engage in sexual relations with the plaintiff, or; defendant either
touching plaintiffs private areas or touching any part of the plaintiffs body with his private
parts").
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addition to proof of discrimination or harassment, was a prerequisite to establishing the outrageousness of an employer's conduct.82
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was willing to impose
liability "for only the most clearly desperate and ultra extreme
conduct" and thus took an extremely narrow view of the intentional
infliction tort, it still clung to a holistic approach, judging each case
on its particular facts. 8 Not surprisingly, decisions in this area
often lack analysis: as in Pucci,courts tend to recite the facts of the
instant case, indicate that recovery was denied in other cases of bad
conduct, and rule that the conduct in the instant case does not meet
the demanding standard for outrageousness.8 4
Nor is the employment context clearly what is driving the courts'
narrow view of outrageousness. Although opinions will sometimes
state that courts are "particularly hesitant" to allow an infliction
claim within an employment setting, they rarely explain why this
is the case and cite to non-employment precedents as well as
general principles of law to justify their decisions.8 5 The courts'
silence on this score is confusing, given that the traditional
reluctance to interfere with management prerogative by altering
the longstanding rule of "at will" employment would not seem to be
particularly relevant in cases of sexual or racial harassment.
Rather, these cases typically are "working conditions" cases not
premised on unlawful discharges. In any event, employers clearly
no longer have the right or prerogative to discriminate on grounds
such as race or sex. 8 What emerges from these cases-particularly
if the courts are to be taken at their word-is the view that
harassment and discrimination are not intolerable conduct under
prevailing cultural standards, or at least are not within the proper
domain of tort law.
A very different portrait of the intersection of torts and civil
rights comes from a minority of jurisdictions that allow intentional
82. See Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 754 (Pa. 1998).
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Jackson v. Blue Dolphin Commc'ns of N.C., L.L.C., 226 F. Supp. 2d 785, 79394 (W.D.N.C. 2002); Pucci v. USAIR, 940 F. Supp. 305, 307-09 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
85. See, e.g., Jackson, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 794; Hollomon v. Keadle, 931 S.W.2d 413, 417
(Ark. 1996) ("[We will take a strict view in recognizing a claim for the tort of outrage in
employment relationship situations.").
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (prohibiting employment discrimination against any
individual because of race or sex).
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infliction claims to proceed in cases not markedly different from
the Pucci sexual harassment case. A good example is Coates v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,87 a sexual harassment case decided by the
Supreme Court of New Mexico in 1999. The harasser in that case
was a supervisor at Sam's Club who persistently targeted women
employees, including the two plaintiffs in the case, while management stood by and did nothing."8 In addition to complaining about
the supervisor's obscene gestures and "lewd and vulgar suggestions," the plaintiffs in Coates also pointed to two incidents of
physical harassment in which the supervisor grabbed the breasts
of one of the plaintiffs and pulled open the blouse of another woman
employee." Wal-Mart managers observed some of this behavior, yet
did not reprimand or discipline the offending supervisor and at one
point told one of the plaintiffs that she could quit if she did not like
their decisions. 90
The state trial court allowed the intentional infliction claim and
another state law claim to proceed against Wal-Mart.9 1 The jury
was apparently of the view that defendant's conduct was indeed
outrageous, as evidenced by the size of the verdict for each of the
two plaintiffs, particularly the portion for punitive damages-one
plaintiff received $1.2 million, the other, $555,000.92 In marked
contrast to the Florida court, the New Mexico Supreme Court
upheld the judgment, using the same Restatement framework of
liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.9 3 Rather
than drawing a contrast between discrimination and outrageous
87. 976 P.2d 999 (N.M. 1999). Courts in Alaska, the District of Columbia, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming have also taken a more
liberal approach to the intentional infliction tort in the employment context. See Pollard v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours, Inc., 412 F.3d 657, 664-65 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying Tennessee law);
Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Stewart, 990 P.2d 626, 634-36 (Alaska 1999) (race discrimination); Norcon,
Inc. v. Kotowski, 971 P.2d 158, 172-73 (Alaska 1999); Estate of Underwood v. Nat'l Credit
Union Admin., 665 A.2d 621, 640 (D.C. 1995); Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 699-700 (N.J.
1998); Swenson v. N. Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174, 181-86 (N.D. 1993); Harris v. Pameco
Corp., 12 P.3d 524, 529 (Or. Ct. App. 2000); Retherford v. AT & T Commc'ns of Mountain
States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 977-78 (Utah 1992); Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 620
(Wash. 2002); Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1341-44 (Wyo. 1997).
88. Coates, 976 P.2d at 1002-03.
89. Id. at 1002.
90. Id. at 1002-03.
91. Id. at 1003.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1009.
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conduct, however, the New Mexico Supreme Court stressed the
compatibility between civil rights and tort law, declaring that
"[a]llowing a worker subjected to sexual harassment to seek civil
damages 'not only vindicates the state's interest in enforcing public
policy but also adequately redresses the harm to the individual
naturally flowing from the violation of public policy."'94
There are ways, of course, to distinguish Pucci and Coates. The
supervisor in Coates committed a battery against one of the plaintiffs and physically assaulted another woman employee, while the
harassment in Pucci was solely of the nonphysical variety, that is,
humiliating comments and the use of pornography. Nevertheless,
the New Mexico Supreme Court in Coates also upheld the jury's
verdict in favor of one of the woman employees who did not suffer
any physical harassment and stressed that all incidents should
be "viewed cumulatively" under the intentional infliction tort.9 5
Significantly, the plaintiff in Coates who was physically harassed
did not assert a claim for battery and did not otherwise emphasize
the physical aspect of her harassment. While undoubtedly each
incident in Coates, including the two incidents of physical harassment, was important in proving the persistent and serious nature
of the harassment, it was also very important that the harassment
lasted for approximately a year and that Wal-Mart's management
was callously indifferent to the plaintiffs' plight.9 6 In these last two
respects, Coates and Pucci are quite similar.9 7 Finally, it is not
irrational to regard the harassment in Pucci as even more damaging than that endured by the Wal-Mart employees in Coates: at
least the women at Wal-Mart were able to band together to resist
their harassment, while Pucci's status as the only woman on her
shift increased her isolation and arguably worsened her predica98
ment.
As I read the cases, the widely disparate results in Coates and
Pucci cannot be explained simply by a judgment that the harass94. Id. at 1005 (citing Michaels v. Anglo Am. Auto Auctions, Inc., 869 P.2d 279,281 (N.M.
1994)).
95. Id. at 1009-10.
96. See id. at 1002-03.
97. See Pucci v. USAIR, 940 F. Supp. 305, 307-08 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Coates, 976 P.2d at
1002-03.
98. See Pucci, 940 F. Supp. at 307-08; Coates, 976 P.2d at 1002-03.

20071

DISCRIMINATION AND OUTRAGE

2135

ment in Coates was worse than that in Pucci. Instead, the courts in
the two cases apparently used two different approaches to the
intentional infliction tort, although each purported to adhere to the
Restatement elements. The Florida court approached the intentional
infliction tort as a gap filler to be used sparingly in the employment
context, presumably only in exceptional cases of harassment or
discrimination that stand apart from the typical civil rights case.9"
In contrast, the New Mexico court approached the infliction tort on
more equal grounds: it viewed the claim as reinforcement of the
state's public policy against discrimination and harassment and
was willing to shape the tort concept of outrageousness along the
lines of antidiscrimination law.' In other words, migration from
civil rights to torts was encouraged in New Mexico and strongly
discouraged in Florida.
The debate over the role of the intentional infliction tort has also
been played out even more explicitly in cases raising preemption
challenges. The essence of a claim of preemption, after all, is that
no overlap can exist between the two domains of law. Thus,
proponents of preemption assert that the intentional infliction tort
may only fill gaps when it comes to civil rights claims, whereas
opponents of preemption leave more room for overlap and migration
from civil rights. The two general approaches described above
resurface in the preemption cases dealing with harassment claims
in the workplace, although resolution of preemption challenges
often requires courts to grapple with issues of statutory interpretation beyond simply deciding the proper role of the intentional
infliction tort.' 0 Those courts denying preemption stress the state's
strong public policy against discrimination and encourage its
reinforcement through tort law, while those upholding preemption
strive to make sure that tort law does not duplicate or encroach
upon other legal domains.
Title VII itself contains an express provision indicating that it
does not preempt state law claims.'0 2 As a result, in workplace
torts, preemption challenges have generally been made on one of

99.
100.
101.
102.

See
See
See
See

Pucci, 940 F. Supp. at 309.
Coates, 976 P.2d at 1005, 1009-10.
infra notes 105-23 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2000).
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two bases:' either the tort claim is preempted by the state civil
rights statute' °4 or the tort claim is barred by the exclusivity
provision of the state workers' compensation statute. 0 5 The former
claim maps quite closely onto the view that the infliction tort is only
a gap filler and should disappear whenever a state statutory claim
for civil rights violation is available. In fact, it is often difficult to
tell whether this ground for precluding the intentional infliction
claim lies in the gap filling nature of the tort itself or is based on
preemption, that is, the determination that the state legislature
intended the civil rights remedy to be exclusive. For example, the
Texas Supreme Court recently held that the claim for intentional
infliction could not be brought "[i]f the gravamen of a plaintiffs
complaint is the type of wrong that the statutory [civil rights]
remedy was meant to cover."'' 6 The holding of the Texas Supreme
Court sounds like the claim is preempted by the civil rights statute
and indeed subsequent courts have used the language of preemption in applying the Texas rule.' °7 However, a concurring justice on
the Texas Supreme Court insisted that the rule was "not based on
the exclusive or preemptive nature of another remedy but on the
nature of the [intentional infliction] tort itself."' 0 ' The subtle
difference here is that a preemption analysis focuses more on the
legislature's intent when passing the civil rights act and on the
actual existence of an alternative statutory remedy, whereas, in the
gap-filling view of the intentional infliction tort, the court disallows
the tort claim because of its own view that the intentional infliction
tort should be restricted to unusual cases that do not fit comfortably
under other recognized theories of redress.
103. In organized workplaces, courts may also have to determine whether a tort claim is
preempted by section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act. See, e.g.,
Chung v. McCabe Hamilton & Renny Co., 128 P.3d 833, 846-47 (Haw. 2006) (holding that a
tort claim was not preempted because it arose from the particularly abusive manner in which
discrimination was accomplished); Retherford v. AT & T Commc'ns of Mountain States, Inc.,
844 P.2d 949, 971-72 (Utah 1992) (holding that a tort claim is preempted unless it "is purely
personal and does not implicate the exercise of supervisory authority").
104. See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
106. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 448 (Tex. 2004).
107. See, e.g., Garza v. Univision, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:04CV1905-K, 2005 WL 1107374, at *3
(N.D. Tex. May 6, 2005) (holding an intentional infliction claim preempted because it was
based on the same facts that supported of the Title VII claim).
108. Hoffmann-La Roche, 144 S.W.3d at 451 (Hecht, J., concurring).
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So far, only a handful of courts have held that the intentional
infliction claim is preempted by state civil rights acts.1" 9 More
courts reject preemption on this ground, ruling that the state civil
rights legislation was designed to increase remedies for victims of
discrimination and is not inconsistent with allowing common law
claims.' °
The other quite distinct preemption challenge is based on state
workers' compensation statutes that bar plaintiffs from suing
employers in tort.' In these cases, employers argue that tort
claims based on sexual harassment cannot be brought because the
employee's sole remedy is to receive compensation under the
prevailing state workers' compensation scheme. 1 2 In this genre of
preemption challenges, the contest is not between tort and civil
rights, but rather between tort and workers' compensation. The
discussion of civil rights laws and the policies animating them
comes up only indirectly as the courts grapple with whether victims
of sexual harassment would be ill-served by channeling their claims
into the workers' compensation system, well known for its ungenerous awards and designed principally to respond to industrial
accidents and occupational disease." 3 Amidst technical discussions
of whether the sexual harassment claim "arises out of' and "in the
course" of employment or falls within one of the enumerated
exceptions to workers' compensation coverage, courts are also called
upon to decide whether preserving a tort claim for harassment and

109. See Quantock v. Shared Mktg. Servs., Inc., 312 F.3d 899,905 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying
Illinois law); Greenland v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Iowa 1993); Arthur v. Pierre
Ltd., 100 P.3d 987 (Mont. 2004); see alsoWilson v. Lowe's Home Ctr., 75 S.W.3d 229, 239 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the claim against the employer was preempted, but the claim
against the individual supervisor was not preempted).
110. See Burns v. Mayer, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1267-68 (D.Nev. 2001); Funk v. F & K
Supply, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 205, 218 (N.D.N.Y. 1999); Cronin v. Sheldon, 991 P.2d 231, 241
(Ariz. 1999); Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 382 (Cal. 1990); Helmick v. Cincinnati Word
Processing, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (Ohio 1989); Retherford v. AT & T Commc'ns of
Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 967 (Utah 1992); see also Wilson, 75 S.W.3d at 235
(allowing the plaintiff to elect whether to proceed under tort or civil rights against an
individual harasser).
111. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
112. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
113. See Jane Byeff Korn, The Fungible Woman and Other Myths of Sexual Harassment,
67 TUL. L. Rev. 1363, 1418 (1993) (discussing the inadequacy of a workers' compensation
award for sexual harassment claims).
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discrimination serves an important state interest.1 14 On this point,
the workers' compensation preemption decisions have tended to
reiterate the "gap filler" versus "reinforcement of civil rights"
debate discussed above and have produced sharp splits in the
jurisdictions.1 15
Some of the strongest statements in favor of allowing civil rights
principles to migrate into tort law have come in the workers'
compensation preemption cases. 6 A leading decision from the
Supreme Court of Florida in 1989 took a broad view of that state's
commitment to eradicating sexual harassment, declaring that the
state's workers' compensation scheme did not bar tort actions based
on harassment and insisting that "[p] ublic policy now requires that
employers be held accountable in tort for the sexually harassing
environments they permit to exist, whether the tort claim is
premised on a remedial statute or on the common law." 7 Similar
sentiments about the importance of allowing "cumulative remedies"
for harassment victims to reinforce "the strong public policies
against sexual harassment" have been echoed more recently by the
Supreme Court of Colorado in a same-sex harassment case alleging
intentional infliction and other tort claims against an employer."'
For these states, preservation of a tort remedy serves to vindicate
the "intangible injury to personal rights" caused by harassment that
"robs the person of dignity and self esteem." '1 9
The states that have barred tort claims for harassment in favor
of state workers' compensation coverage do not deny a public policy
against harassment, but instead feel comforted by the fact that
harassment victims can sue under state and federal civil rights
114. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
115. See cases cited infra notes 116, 120.
116. See Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 588-89 (Ariz. 1987); Horodyskyj v. Karanian,
32 P.3d 470, 479 (Colo. 2001); Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099,
1103-04 (Fla. 1989); Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 976 P.2d 999, 1004-05, 1006 (N.M.
1999); Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428,435 (Ohio 1991); see alsoBusby v. Truswal
Sys. Corp., 551 So. 2d 322, 324-25 (Ala. 1989) (holding that an intentional infliction claim for
sexual harassment was not barred by a workers' compensation exclusivity provision); Hogan
v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116, 120 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (accord); Anderson v.
Save-A-Lot, Ltd., 989 S.W.2d 277, 288-89 (Tenn. 1999) (accord); Middlekauff v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 439 S.E.2d 394, 396-97 (Va. 1994) (accord).
117. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1104.
118. Horodyskyj, 32 P.3d at 479.
119. Byrd, 552 So. 2d at 1104.
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acts. 12 These courts see no pressing need for a common law tort
claim, even if the workers' compensation remedy is inadequate or
ill-designed to address intangible injuries like harassment. In their
view, as long as harassment is addressed by civil rights statutes,
the state's public policy is vindicated and needs no reinforcement
through the common law. 121 Beneath discussion of the technical
issues seems to be the view that common law claims, such as the
intentional infliction tort, are mere gap fillers, and that harassment
claims are properly located as statutory civil rights claims.
II. THE DOMAINS OF TORTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

The two contrasting views of the intentional infliction tort are
linked to judgments about the respective domains of torts and civil
rights and the proper location for a claim of harassment. Whether
a court permits an intentional infliction claim to proceed depends
in part on whether the court believes that it "fits" within torts or is
better handled under the theories and remedies civil rights statutes
provide. The choice of approach thus may hinge on categorization.
One dilemma surrounding the proper handling of claims alleging
harassment in the workplace is that, conceptually, the harassment
claim does not fit particularly well under either torts or civil rights.
In some respects, it is an interloper into both domains. Despite its
prevalence, harassment is neither the prototypical tort, nor the
prototypical Title VII claim. Instead, each field of law has had to
adjust to accommodate claims of harassment within its frameworks
and the adjustment has not always been smooth.

120. See Hardebeck v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1064-65 (E.D. Mo.
2000); Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 690 A.2d 936, 940 (Del. 1996); Gordan v.
Cummings, 756 A.2d 942, 945 (Me. 2000); Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 664 N.E.2d 808,813
(Mass. 1996); Fernandez v. Ramsey County, 495 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993);
Nassa v. Hook-SupeRx, Inc., 790 A.2d 368,373-74 (R.I. 2002); Jenson v. Employers Mut. Cas.
Co., 468 N.W.2d 1, 7-8 (Wis. 1991); see also Dickert v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 428 S.E.2d 700,
701-02 (S.C. 1993) (holding that workers' compensation barred a tort claim against the
employer but not against the supervisory employees).
121. See, e.g., Fernandez,495 N.W.2d at 862 ("[S]exual harassment claims will ordinarily
be brought under [state civil rights statutes], and it could be argued that creating exceptions
for categories of injuries that occur in the workplace undermines the ultimate effectiveness
of the Workers' Compensation Act in compensating injured workers.").
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Since its inception, Title VII law has primarily been directed to
workplace injuries that result in direct economic harm. 12 2 Discriminatory terminations, demotions, refusals to promote, and other
tainted decisions affecting employment status are the primary
harms addressed by the statute. 123 Additionally, because it was
enacted in response to the civil rights movement for racial equality,
Title VII has a built-in group-based focus. The "equal employment
opportunity" promised by the law has most often been associated
with eliminating race or sex-based animus, regarded as the driving
force behind discriminatory employment decisions and the principal
cause of harm to the protected class. 124 Although individual claims
far outnumber class actions under Title VII,125 the search for groupbased animus often projects litigation beyond individual, discrete
incidents into an evaluation of treatment of the group and requires
plaintiffs to situate themselves as members of a protected group to
secure relief.1 26 Finally, as originally conceived, a principal aim of
Title VII was to dismantle longstanding patterns of segregation and
exclusion in the workplace and to stimulate businesses to take
action to prevent discrimination.' 2 7 Under the Act, courts have
imposed liability solely upon employers, and not upon the individual supervisors or managers who make the discriminatory decisions. 12 ' Title VII thus embraces a form of enterprise liability that
reflects the view that employers are in the best position to deter
122. Some scholars debate whether plaintiffs must prove that they suffered "materially
adverse effects" to recover for disparate treatment. See Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer
Games Count as Terms, Conditionsor Privilegesof Employment Under Title VII?, 37 B.C. L.
REV. 643, 656-63 (1996); Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination,47 EMORY L.J.
1121, 1142-47 (1998).
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (prohibiting race and sex discrimination specifically
in "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment").
124. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) ('CThe language of
Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equal employment opportunities and
to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified
job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.").
125. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The ChangingNature of Employment
DiscriminationLitigation,43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 984 & n.2 (1991).
126. This group-based focus also justifies the award of attorney's fees to prevailing Title
VII plaintiffs who are said to act as "private attorneys general" in their enforcement of the
Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000).
127. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (describing Title
VII's purpose "to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy").
128. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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future discriminatory acts and to restore plaintiffs to their rightful
employment status.
When harassment claims first surfaced in the mid-1970s, a
decade after Title VII was enacted, they posed a challenge for
existing theories of liability. In particular, hostile environment
harassment claims did not fit well into the Title VII framework
because they frequently involved repeated abusive conduct that did
not translate into direct economic harm. 129 Harassment victims
tended to complain of psychological and intangible injury that
ripened into loss of pay only in cases of constructive discharge.13
Additionally, harassment victims had a much harder time proving
that their mistreatment was both group based and predicated on
sex. Traditionalist notions about the harmless and inevitable
nature of sexual propositioning, teasing, hazing, and other forms of
sexualized conduct persisted. Many courts continued to view such
interactions as personal in nature and as stemming from sexual
attraction or some other individualized motivation, rather than
from group-based animus.' 3 1 Moreover, this privatized, individual
view of sexual harassment did not sit well with the imposition of
enterprise liability. For many, it seemed strange to let the offending harasser off the hook, while requiring employers to reign in
supervisors and coworkers for everyday interactions that sometimes
took place beneath an employer's radar screen. Despite strenuous
arguments by feminist scholars and litigators that sexual harassment was a virulent form of sex discrimination that harmed women
and other targets as much as unequal pay or lost promotions,1 32 the

129. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) (rejecting the
defendant's contention that direct economic harm was needed to prove Title VII violation).
130. See Martha Chamallas, Title VII's Midlife Crisis:The Case of ConstructiveDischarge,
77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 315-21 (2004) (discussing the relationship between hostile environment and constructive discharge claims).
131. See Cheryl L. Anderson, "Thinking Within the Box" How ProofModels Are Used To
Limit the Scope of Sexual Harassment Law, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 125, 137-38 (2001);
Eric Schnapper, Some of Them Still Don't Get It: Hostile Work Environment Litigation in the
Lower Courts, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277, 292-93.
132. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1207-09 (1989); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43
STAN. L. REV. 813, 820 (1991); Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in
Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings,65 S.CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1291 (1992).
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claim has always been treated as somewhat suspect and as
qualitatively different from core violations of Title VII. 133
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in the wake of the
Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas controversy eased the way somewhat
for sexual harassment suits, but it did not erase the basic tension
between harassment claims and the prototypical discrimination
suit. The most important change came with respect to remedies: for
the first time, Title VII plaintiffs were permitted to obtain jury
trials and to recover compensatory and punitive damages, in
addition to monetary awards for backpay.' 3 4 This meant that
harassment victims could recover a monetary award for mental
anguish and psychological harm, even if they stayed on their jobs
and did not allege constructive discharge. However, the 1991 Act
also placed a total cap on the amount of compensatory and punitive
damages at between $50,000 and $300,000, depending on the size
of the employer.1 3
Despite some complaints that the 1991 amendments "tortified"
the Civil Rights Act by introducing jury trials and tort-like damages, 136 sexual harassment has remained a disfavored claim within
Title VII and has not yet redirected the Act away from its primary
37
focus on economic loss caused by a change in employment status.1
The disfavored status of the sexual harassment claim can be seen
in the various specialized elements of the claim. As a threshold for
imposing liability, plaintiffs alleging harassment are subject to
heightened proof requirements: they must prove that they suffered
"severe or pervasive" harassment,1 3 compared to other discrimination claimants who can prevail upon proof of a single, discriminatory decision with economic consequences.13 9 The standard for

133. See Chamallas, supra note 130, at 355-56 (2004) (discussing "special requirements
and onerous burdens of proof' attached to Title VII sexual harassment actions).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (c) (2000).
135. Id. (b)(3).
136. See Dennis P. Duffy, IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distressand Employment at
Will: The Case Against 'Tortification"of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387,
398-99 (1994).
137. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
138. See id. (stating that conduct must be "severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment").
139. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,276-85 (1976) (holding that
the racially discriminatory discharge of the plaintiffs violated Title VII).
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holding employers liable for the acts of supervisors is also more
demanding in sexual harassment cases: strict liability is imposed
in cases of discriminatory firings or demotions, but in harassment
cases employers may often escape liability if they prove that they
acted reasonably. 140 Finally, as mentioned above, recovery of the
noneconomic damages that typically flow from sexual harassment
are capped at relatively modest amounts that may be far below the
plaintiffs injuries, but there is no cap on the key economic components of damage awards, that is, backpay or frontpay. 14 ' For the
most part, courts interpreting state civil rights statutes have
followed the lead of Title VII courts, treating harassment claims in
a similar disfavored fashion. 142 Although a few states provide for
individual liability of supervisors' 43 and are a bit more liberal with
respect to threshold requirements and vicarious liability, most
adopting the skepticism
approach harassment claims guardedly,
144
that characterizes the Title VII courts.
Although civil rights law can still possibly be refashioned to
lessen the privilege afforded economic injury and to provide more
secure relief for harassment victims, there is little sign of such a
movement. 145 Instead, to a considerable extent, Title VII and the
parallel state statutory schemes appear fixed on a model of
140. Many employers are successful in proving an affirmative defense to liability in hostile
environment sexual harassment cases premised largely on the employer's reasonable
response to harassment complaints. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765
(1998).
141. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 852-54 (2001) (holding
that backpay and frontpay are equitable remedies not subject to the cap). Frontpay is loss
of pay from the time of judgment to reinstatement.
142. See, e.g., Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., 840 S.W.2d 814, 820-21 (Ky. 1992) (using
Title VII to interpret a state statute to include "severe or pervasive" requirement); Downer
v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 477 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing an
employer's affirmative defense for reasonably responding to reports of sexual harassment by
another employer).
143. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seller Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding individual
managers who participated in unlawful conduct liable under the New York Human Rights
Law). But see Foster v. Shore Club Lodge, Inc., 908 P.2d 1228, 1232-33 (Idaho 1995) (finding
no individual liability under the Idaho Human Rights Act).
144. See supranote 142.
145. Indeed, the trend may be the opposite. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court
differentiated between constructive discharges prompted by sexual harassment and those
prompted by discrete, discriminatory acts, such as demotions. Employers are permitted an
affirmative defense to liability in the sexual harassment situation, but not inthe demotion
context. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146-49 (2004).
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economic harm/group-based animus/enterprise liability that sets
harassment claims apart from the core of civil rights. For this
reason, it is not clear that civil rights is the natural home for
harassment litigation or that all claims should be located exclusively in that domain.
With respect to tort law, claims alleging harassment are also
marginalized, principally because they do not resemble the classic
personal injury. As the recent Restatement of Torts has made clear,
claims of physical injury-rather than claims for emotional or
economic loss-are situated at the core of tort law. 146 When a cause
of action is characterized as an emotional distress claim, the
ordinary rules of liability tend not to apply. Instead, similarly to
other "stand alone" claims for emotional distress, tort claims for
harassment sit precariously at the margins of recovery, with
considerable variation among the states in the specific rules applied
and the prospects for success.14 7
Admittedly, the privileging of claims for physical injury under
tort law is not total. There is a long history of protecting some
dignitary interests against tortious intentional invasion. However,
before the development of the "new" tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the dignitary interests protected were exceedingly narrow in scope and highly gendered along traditional lines.
The torts of assault and slander, for example, were best suited to
securing older conceptions of male honor and female chastity and
need to be stretched to fit contemporary claims of workplace
harassment. Thus, the tort of assault affords recovery only for
physically threatening conduct and was originally designed to
reduce the incentive for retaliation and escalation of physical
violence. 4 To warrant recovery, the physical harm threatened
146. In fact, the new Restatement project was initially called "Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Liability for Physical Harm" to underscore its central focus on physical harms, rather
than on emotional distress or economic loss. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM xiii (Council Draft No. 6, 2006). However, the project
was later renamed and revised to include key sections relating to emotional disturbance. For
a critique of the new Restatement's structure, see generally Martha Chamallas, Removing
Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 751 (2001).
147. See supra notes 51-100 and accompanying text.
148. Charles E. Carpenter, IntentionalInvasion of Interest of Personality,13 OR. L. REV.
227, 237 (1933) (stating that a cause of action for assault will discourage breaches of the
peace); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 24 (1965) ("[The other must believe that the

2007]

DISCRIMINATION AND OUTRAGE

2145

must be imminent, and it was sometimes said that words alone do
not constitute an assault. 149 These limitations have meant that a
claim for assault is generally unavailable in contexts where it is
perceived that targets would be unlikely to fight back, but might
respond passively by internalizing the pain. Most notably, "mere"
solicitation to have sex was not generally regarded as actionable, no
matter how insulting or offensive to the target. 150
Similarly, the tort of slander has so far proved incapable of
responding to the harms of harassment. Traditionally, slander
actions were designed to provide redress for damage to reputation,
including sexual reputation, and often centered on a female
plaintiffs reputation for chastity." ' In the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, women plaintiffs often prevailed in defamation
suits when they alleged that defendants made false statements
impugning their reputation for sexual propriety.12 Many courts
even adopted the view that such claims amounted to slander per se,
and dispensed with the need to prove special damages. 1 53 However,
when the locus of slander suits changed from the private sphere to
the more public sphere of work, women had far less success
convincing courts that the kind of sexual slurs and taunts that
characterize a hostile working environment amounted to actionable
defamation. According to Professor Lisa Pruitt's extensive history
of defamation cases, contemporary courts are now apt to deny
recovery and to regard the offending statements as utterly lacking
1 54
in content and incapable of being judged as either true or false.
Because the older, particularized torts have not been reshaped to
capture harassment, liability will often depend on the scope courts
act may result in imminent contact unless prevented from so resulting by the other's selfdefensive action ...
or by the intervention of some outside force.").
149. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814, 815 (Minn. 1926); Prince v. Ridge, 66
N.Y.S. 454,455 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1900) (ruling that a solicitation to have sex was not an assault,
relying on the "[m]ere words" doctrine).
150. See Reed v. Maley, 74 S.W. 1079, 1080-81 (Ky. 1903); Prince,66 N.Y.S. at 455.
151. Lisa R. Pruitt, Her Own Good Name: Two Centuries of Talk About Chastity, 63 MD.
L. REV. 401, 419-45 (2004).
152. See Lisa R. Pruitt, "On the Chastity of Women All Property in the World Depends"
Injury from Sexual Slander in the Nineteenth Century, 78 IND. L.J. 965, 968 (2003).
153. Andrew J. King, ConstructingGender:Sexual Slanderin Nineteenth-centuryAmerica,
13 LAW & HIST. REV. 63, 72-73 (1993); Pruitt, supranote 152, at 968 (discussing the origin
of the slander per se rule).
154. Pruitt, supra note 151, at 461.
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are willing to give to the intentional infliction tort and on whether
they regard harassment claims as otherwise a good fit for tort law.
In key respects, the conceptual domain of torts contrasts sharply
with the description provided above of the domain of civil rights,
but this does not mean that torts is a natural home for harassment
claims. In addition to its focus on physical harm, tort law is highly
individualistic and cast in universal terms. Far from carving out
protected classes, tort law is uncomfortable treating claimants as
members of social groups or expressly taking account of status
distinctions. Particularly in the dominant corrective justice account
of tort law, considerable emphasis is placed on injurers' moral
responsibility to compensate for the harm they cause,'5 5 a responsibility that maps easily onto individual liability but is less compatible with broader notions of enterprise liability.
If qualms about allowing recovery for pure emotional distress
could be allayed, tort claims based on harassing conduct might be
poured into such a model, particularly if the claim is brought only
against an individual supervisor, not the employer, and is made
universally available to all employees, regardless of their social
group. Many harassment claimants, however, do not wish to
circumscribe their harassment claim to fit this universal focus/individual liability model. Instead, victims frequently elect to
press claims against their employers for failing to prevent or
eliminate hostile environments 5 ' and stress that their harassment
is qualitatively different from other kinds of abusive behavior
because it implicates an important dimension of their social
157
identity.
The lack of a perfect fit for claims of workplace harassment in
either civil rights or tort law reflects the multidimensional quality
155. See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992) (building a theory of
corrective justice around morally based claims for repair or rectification by parties in a
relationship to one another); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995) (building
a theory of corrective justice on the "special morality" of the relationship between injurer and
injured). See also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice,91 GEO. L.J.
695, 695-709 (2003) (explaining the principal features of the corrective justice approach to
tort law).
156. See, e.g., Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 976 P.2d 999, 1002 (N.M. 1999); Robel v.
Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 614 (Wash. 2002) (pressing tort claim only against employer).
157. See infra text accompanying notes 178-81 (discussing social dimension of the harm
of harassment).
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of the harm that defies categorization under traditional headings.
One reason courts have so much trouble positioning claims of
harassment is because such claims often articulate a type of
injury-disproportionately experienced by members of subordinated
groups-that cannot be pinned down as psychological, economic, or
physical in nature, or as either individual or group based.
Early on, grassroots activists identified the multiple injuries
harassment could inflict,15 followed by studies by social scientists
that documented the incidence of harassment and the various
features of this newly "discovered" phenomenon.' 59 Perhaps easiest
to see was the psychological dimension of harassment, which
produced mental anguish, humiliation, and shame in targets who
were forced to confront harassment on a regular basis as part of
their jobs. 6° Surveys of employees indicated that harassment was
widespread and often regarded as a very troubling aspect of the
job. 161
Moreover, both the narratives of working women who were
victims of harassment and the empirical studies showed how easily
psychological distress translated into economic or physical harm. In
many cases of severe harassment, a common response for victims
was to quit their jobs, with the resulting loss of pay, seniority, and
depressed chances for advancement that interruption of employment brings.' 62 Even when victims stuck it out and stayed on the
job, harassment often flattened their aspirations for mobility, with
negative economic consequences.' 63 Women were often reluctant to
seek transfers or promotions to more lucrative male-dominated jobs
for fear of increased harassment when they entered such hostile
domains, 164 or they turned their desires and motivations away from
158. See Martha Chamallas, Essay, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the
Literature,4 UCLAWOMEN'S L.J. 37, 39-43 (1993); Reva B. Siegel, A Short History of Sexual
Harassment,in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 1, 11-18 (Catharine A. MacKinnon
& Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).

159. See Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment,61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671,671-73 (2000); Barbara A. Gutek, UnderstandingSexual
Harassmentat Work, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 335, 343-45 (1992).
160. Gutek, supra note 159, at 348-49.
161. See id. at 343-45, 348-49.
162. See Abrams, supra note 15, at 1197.
163. See id.
164. See id.
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their jobs in an attempt to minimize the importance of working in
their lives and reduce the pain of being ostracized and ridiculed at
work. 165 Additionally, accounts of harassment victims detailed how
the mounting stress of harassment could produce physical harm.
Like the plaintiff in Pucci, who was hospitalized for anxiety and
claimed she fell down the stairs at work because she believed
coworkers were stalking her,'6 6 harassment victims often end up
seeking treatment for medically recognized conditions and posttraumatic stress disorders that fall into the category of physical
harm. Because any and all of the three types of harms may figure
prominently in an individual case, classifying a harassment claim
as quintessentially a claim for emotional distress, economic injury,
or physical harm is artificial. To be sure, within each domain courts
or legislatures have set limits on compensation for particular types
of injury or damages, and thereby have encouraged litigants to
frame their claims strategically to maximize chances of recovery.'6 7
But such strategic framing does not tell us much about either the
nature of the harassment claim or whether it properly belongs in
civil rights, torts, or both domains.
In addition to the problem of reducing harassment to either
physical, emotional, or economic injury, it is often difficult to
express or specify the extra harm that results when harassment is
premised upon or exploits a person's sex, race, or other aspect of
identity. Scholars have written extensively about the social and
political aspects of identity-based harassment and discrimination,
explaining why such conduct is often worse, or at least different
from, more randomly imposed abuse or personally motivated
conduct. 6 ' Literature focusing on race and ethnicity often empha165. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: JudicialInterpretations
of Sex Segregationin the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of InterestArgument,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1802 (1990).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
167. For example, to offset the Title VII caps on compensatory damages, plaintiffs in
hostile working environment cases often assert claims for constructive discharge in order to
entitle themselves to uncapped awards for backpay. See Chamallas, supra note 130, at 31521. Tort claimants resisting claims of preemption often stress the personal, psychological
quality of the harassment suffered, to differentiate it from either group-based harms
addressed by civil rights laws or physical injuries addressed by workers' compensation. See
Kryeski v. Schott Glass Techs. Inc., 9 Pa. D. & C.4th 399, 402-03 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1991);
Anderson v. Save-A-Lot, Ltd., 989 S.W.2d 277, 289-90 (Tenn. 1999).
168. See Lenhardt, supra note 14, at 836.
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sizes how harassing conduct can operate simultaneously to
stigmatize and dehumanize the target and the social group to which
the target belongs.16 9 Similar to the impact of hate crimes, the
impact of harassment often reverberates beyond the specific target,
causing distress and vulnerability to other members of the group, 7 0
such as women employees who witness a female coworker being
groped or abused sexually. Even persons who are not specifically
targeted for harassment must often expend extra work and
emotional energy to devise strategies to avoid harassment. 7 '
Scholarship on the distinctive harms of sexual harassment-both
from an antisubordination' 7 2 and a gender-stereotyping perspective' 7 3 -have shown how harassment can devalue its target and
reinforce that person's inferior status in the realm of work. Through
harassment, women workers are sexually objectified and reminded
of their subordinate status in the family and the private sphere of
sexual relationships; male victims of harassment are punished for
not conforming to gender norms or for being gay or perceived to be
gay or effeminate.' 74 Harassment of this sort can produce a special
sense of alienation, social isolation, and vulnerability that impedes
individual efforts to cope with future harassment and saps collective energies for agitating for social change.' 75 Perhaps most
importantly, the ubiquity and everyday nature of sexual and other
forms of harassment may make it particularly hard for individuals
to define and contest their harassment, the more it is naturalized
and seems indistinguishable from just the way things are.'7 6
The social and political damage inflicted by sexual or racial
177
harassment has been variously described as a citizenship harm,

169. See id.
170. See Wang, supranote 13, at 119-20.
171. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259,
1260-62 (1999-2000).
172. See Abrams, supra note 15, at 1217-20.
173. See Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?,49 STAN. L. REV.
691, 696 (1997).
174. Id. at 696, 698.
175. See Wang, supranote 13, at 119.
176. See Beth A. Quinn, The Paradoxof Complaining:Law, Humor, and Harassmentin
the Everyday Work World, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1151, 1167-71 (2000).
177. See Lenhardt, supra note 14, at 844-47.
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a harm of subordination, 7 ' or harm to identity.17 9 Each of these
descriptions attempts to capture the significance of the injury
occurring within a social environment and details how the social
meaning of victimization may differ depending on the identity of the
victim, the hierarchies in the working group, and the larger cultural
setting. This social dimension of claims of harassment also means
that characterizing it as focused on the individual or the group is
tricky. Although the harm can only be understood in relation to the
status and social meaning attached to the targeted group, it is
ultimately visited on individuals and inevitably experienced by such
individuals differently. Thus, some people exposed to repeated
harassment cope by trying not to take it personally and resigning
themselves to the inevitability of the treatment,1 80 whereas others
respond by complaining to sympathetic coworkers, and less frequently, to company officials.'' Perhaps more so than other
injuries, the harm produced by harassment is a function of both the
quality and degree of the harasser's conduct and the target's
8 2 For that reason,
response."
the claim does not fit comfortably in
either torts or civil rights, which concentrate on more determinate
economic and physical harms. Moreover, because harassment
claims traverse traditional boundaries, they risk being shut out or
stripped down in each domain: for many Title VII courts, harassment claims are too personal and lack the job relatedness of other
discrimination claims; for many common law courts, harassment
claims are not claims for personal injuries, but for violations of
public regulations of employment.
Rather than attempt to discover the best conceptual fit for
harassment claims, it may be more productive to focus directly on
questions of whether the degree of protection offered by civil rights
law is enough and whether there should be a place for litigating
harassment claims in tort law as well. Before making a choice
178. See MAcKINNON, supra note 31, at 174.
179. Martha Chamallas, Lucky: The Sequel, 80 IND. L.J. 441,467-71 (2005) (discussing the
harm to identity from the trauma of rape).
180. Quinn, supra note 176, at 1167-68.
181. See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation,90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 25-32 (2005); L. Camille
H6bert, Why Don't 'ReasonableWomen" Complain About Sexual Harassment?,82 IND. L.J.
(forthcoming 2007) (discussing victims' reluctance to report sexual harassment).
182. Cf. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV.
1625, 1676-85 (2002) (discussing victim responsibility for emotional distress injuries).
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between the "gap filler" versus "reinforcement of civil rights"
approaches, it is worthwhile to consider the history of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and how common law
courts addressed issues implicating race and gender before the
advent of modern civil rights law in the 1960s and 1970s.
III. THE TORT OF OUTRAGE BEFORE CVIL RIGHTS
The intentional infliction tort has the dubious distinction of being
known as a tort created by academics. This reputation stems from
the enormous influence of William Prosser and Calvert Magruder,
the two law professors most responsible for theorizing and shaping
the new cause of action. Although each professor purported merely
8 3 Prosser,
to report on what the courts were doing,"
in particular,
effectively championed the tort in his writings and in his role as
Reporter for the Second Restatement of Torts. 8 4 The tort's official
birth was probably in 1948, when the American Law Institute first
recognized its existence as a separate tort."15 By the mid-1950s, the
tort had taken its current shape and courts increasingly began
labeling conduct as "outrageous" to qualify for recovery under the
86
new formulation.
Notably, the infliction tort did not arise in response to a social
movement, in contrast to the statutory civil rights claims that
reflected the black civil rights and women's liberation movements.
Instead, recognition of the intentional infliction claim was part of
a gradual legal reform movement, starting in the 1930s, which
sought to liberalize recovery for claims of emotional distress more
generally.8 7 Even before recognition of the intentional infliction
tort, many states had been convinced by reformers, for example, to
183. The first line of Prosser's initial article on the subject declares that "[i]t is time to
recognize that the courts have created a new tort." William L. Prosser, IntentionalInfliction
of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 874 (1939).
184. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 161

(expanded ed. 2003).
185. See William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage,44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 41 (1956).
186. See id. at 43-53 (discussing cases that illustrated the "outrageousness" component of
the tort).
187. See N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Act, Recommendation and Study Relating to
Liabilityfor InjuriesResulting from Frightor Shock, in SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LAW
REVISION COMM'N 375, 379-82 (1936).
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discard the old "impact rule" in negligence cases that had required
plaintiffs to prove some physical impact upon their persons before
qualifying for a damage award. 8 Establishing the intentional
infliction tort was thus part of a larger realist project aimed at
rejecting formalist limitations on tort recovery and providing
compensation for serious injuries, regardless of categorization.
Because the infliction tort had little to do with social equality, it
is not surprising that the canonical intentional infliction cases arose
in contexts far removed from gender and race discrimination. In the
conventional history of the tort, the line of cases starts with the
1897 English case, Wilkinson v. Downton 9 The defendant in
Wilkinson played a cruel practical joke on a woman by telling her
that her husband had been smashed up in an accident and that she
should go at once with two pillows to fetch him. 9 ° In allowing
recovery, the court was clearly sympathetic to the plaintiff, who
alleged that she suffered severe physical and mental injuries as a
result of the joke, a claim made believable by the fact that she had
no history of ill health, weakness of constitution, or other predisposition to nervous shock. 9 ' In the United States, the most influential
case was State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, involving
threats of future violence made against a male plaintiff who had
allegedly taken business away from union members.' 92 Writing for
the California Supreme Court, Chief Justice Traynor had little
difficulty endorsing the new tort, especially given the extortionate
behavior of the defendants that came very close to assault. 93 As
these two classic cases suggest, the intentional infliction tort could
range over highly disparate ground, with only the defendant's
reprehensible behavior tying the claim together.
Despite its broad, elastic nature, however, the tort of intentional
infliction seemed especially well suited to claims by women, and
several of the early cases also involved sex-related injuries. Prosser
noticed this gendered aspect of the tort early on, remarking that
"[n]early all of the plaintiffs have been women, usually in that
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 381.
[1897] 2 Q.B. 57.
Id. at 57.
See id. at 58.
240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952).
Id. at 286.
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delicate condition whose standardized consequences have typified
mental suffering cases with the 'customary miscarriage." 94
Prosser's allusion to miscarriages here likely referred to a recurring
line of cases in which pregnant plaintiffs alleged that they suffered
shock, miscarriages, and stillbirths after witnessing their husbands, close relatives, or others being brutally attacked by defendants.'9 5 In such third-party attack cases, the outrageous act of
physical violence was not directed at the plaintiffs and the theory
of recovery for such bystanders uncomfortably straddled the line
between negligence and intentional torts. These cases presented
additional doctrinal difficulties for the courts and did not tell us
much about the kind of actions-short of physical attacks--courts
would consider "outrageous."
Instead, Prosser's remark about the predominance of female
plaintiffs is interesting because he used it to support his broader
claim that courts in intentional infliction cases had permitted
recovery only in cases of "extreme" mental disturbance in which
there was "convincing objective testimony to attest its genuineness."' 9 6 By conjuring an image of a fragile, female plaintiff
easily hurt by callous or brutal behavior, Prosser's rhetoric allayed
fears that the courts would be misused by deceitful plaintiffs
seeking money for fictitious injuries. He had confidence that
judges, in their case-by-case adjudication, would be sensitive to
context and could tell the "difference between violent and vile
profanity addressed to a lady, and the same language to a Butte
miner and a United States Marine."' 9 7 Additionally, it was selfevident to Prosser that ladies and other vulnerable persons suffered
disproportionately from emotional distress and should have their
claims acknowledged as "real wrong[s] entitled to redress."'98
This solicitude for the fragile, female plaintiff also surfaced in
Magruder's seminal article on emotional disturbance.'9 9 Magruder
indicated that he was troubled by a line of slander cases in which
194.
195.
(1933),
196.
197.
198.
199.

Prosser, supra note 183, at 888 (footnote omitted).
Prosser cited an article by Leon Green, "Fright"Cases, 27 ILL. L. REV. 873, 876-77
which discussed the third-party attack cases. Prosser, supra note 183, at 888 n.81.
Prosser, supra note 183, at 888.
Id. at 887.
Id.
See Magruder, supra note 30, at 1047-48

2154

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:2115

female plaintiffs falsely accused of unchastity failed to recover
because they could not prove special damages, that is, pecuniary
damages stemming from injury to their reputation."' One old case,
for example, involved a defendant's false claim of having had
sexual intercourse with the plaintiff, a married woman.20 ' When
the plaintiff heard about the false rumor, she suffered humiliation
and physical illness, but lost her case because she could not show
pecuniary loss. 20 2 Magruder considered the result unjust and an
example of the undue formalism of defamation law.20 3 More
importantly, he declared that if the false statements had been made
in the plaintiffs presence, she ought to be able to recover for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 4 Apparently, Magruder
believed that accusing a woman of adultery was clearly intolerable
conduct that could be expected to result in severe mental distress
and illness. Under this view, in matters of sexual propriety, the
relational and social harm of defamation and the individual harm
of mental distress converged. Magruder seemed willing to allow a
claim for both.
The commentators' sympathetic attitude shifted, however, when
the female plaintiffs claim of injury rested not on an accusation of
unchastity, but on a solicitation to have sex. Magruder started off
the scholarly discussion with a rather tentative assertion about
the state of the law. His famous "no harm in asking" statement was
actually embedded in a paragraph indicating that there was no
clear judicial position on the issue.20 5 Thus, Magruder observed,
[w]omen have occasionally sought damages for mental
distress and humiliation on account of being addressed by a
proposal of illicit intercourse. This is peculiarly a situation
where circumstances alter cases. If there has been no incidental
assault or battery, or perhaps trespass to land, recovery is
generally denied, the view being, apparently, that there is no
harm in asking.2"'
200. See id.
201. Alsop v. Alsop, [1860] 157 Eng. Rep. 1292, 1292 (Exch. Div.).
202. Id.
203. See Magruder, supra note 30, at 1047-48 & n.61.
204. Id. at 1047-48.
205. See id. at 1055.
206. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Magruder's "no harm in asking" statement was somewhat
cryptic: he did not directly endorse the view that such solicitations
were harmless, but merely speculated as to why courts might deny
recovery in such cases. For a formal law review article, however,
use of the phrase was a bit flippant, and perhaps memorable for
that reason.2 °7 It certainly left the impression that Magruder agreed
with the courts in their apparent belief that such conduct was
harmless and distinguishable from more condemnable conduct,
such as a false imputation of unchastity.
In a later article, Prosser reiterated the "no harm in asking"
phrase and left no doubt that he also agreed with its substance.2"'
He classified a solicitation to have sex as a mere insult or indignity
which "amount[ed] to nothing more than annoyances" and contrasted it to "flagrant and outrageous" conduct that justified legal
recovery.0 s Prosser's demarcation line between "extreme and
outrageous" conduct on the one hand, and "mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities" on the
other, would subsequently play a major role in the tort's development, when it was included in the Restatement commentary 2 ° and
cited by a number of courts.2 1 '
In addition to minimizing defendants' conduct in solicitation
cases, Prosser also faulted the responses of plaintiffs. He argued
that if a plaintiff genuinely suffered as a result of such behavior,
her suffering should be regarded as "exaggerated, unreasonable,
and beneath the notice of the law. 21 2 By 1956, Prosser's tone grew
sarcastic. In his notable article, Insult and Outrage, he discussed
how courts in different jurisdictions had treated "the dire affront
of inviting an unwilling woman to illicit intercourse, 2 3 clearly
signaling that he did not regard such situations as "dire" at all. He
was particularly worried that the "chivalry of the southern courts"
207. Prosser characterized Magruder's prose as pungent. See Prosser, supra note 183, at
889 n.87 ("'The view being, apparently,' as Professor Magruder has so pungently put it, 'that
there is no harm in asking.").
208. See id.
209. Id. at 888-89.
210. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
211. See, e.g., Pucci v. USAIR, 940 F. Supp. 305, 309 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Roth v. Wiese, 716
N.W.2d 419, 432 (Neb. 2006); Yeager v. Local Union 20, 453 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ohio 1983).
212. Prosser, supra note 183, at 889.
213. Prosser, supra note 185, at 46.
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would lead them to grant recovery. 214 After relating what he took to
be the majority-and more modern-approach to refuse recovery,
he expressed concern "that it is not altogether certain how long
some of our highly moral tribunals will continue to stand the strain,
215
and there are some indications of a tendency to allow recovery.,
When they wrote in the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s, Prosser and
Magruder were in an unusual position to shape the law, precisely
because there was no settled doctrine or clear trend. The case law
that the professors analyzed was sparse, inconclusive, and itself
reflected conflicting attitudes toward sexual conduct and the limits
of tort law. Some courts displayed hostility toward plaintiffs who
sued for damages related to a solicitation of sex. In one early New
York case, for example, a trial court brusquely dismissed a plaintiffs complaint, stating that there could be no recovery for "words
of persuasion" that were meant "to induce the plaintiff to grant [the
defendant] the favor of sexual intercourse with her."2'16 The plaintiffs complaint stated that the defendant had taken hold of her arm
as she was about to get on a car and had asked her to step aside
because he wanted to see her. 21 7' The plaintiffs complaint then
alluded to the sexual solicitation without elaboration, stating only
that the defendant's acts and words caused her "great shame, injury
and suffering."218 The plaintiffs legal theory was assault and
battery, perhaps based on the defendant's action in holding her
arm and offending her by his proposition.2" 9 The court was clearly
not impressed, however, and dismissed the plaintiffs "so-called
complaint" because it amounted only to "words of illicit solicitation"
22 The court was not inclined to explore
or "unscientific rigmarole.""
whether the law might afford a remedy for injury stemming from
sexual propositions or overtures that did not meet the traditional
definition of battery or assault.
As Prosser suggested with his southern chivalry remark,2 2'
however, the issue was not so easy for a 1903 Kentucky appellate
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Prosser, supra note 183, at 889.
Prosser, supra note 185, at 47.
Prince v. Ridge, 66 N.Y.S. 454, 455 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1900).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Prosser, supra note 185, at 45.
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court, which gave a more serious and thorough examination of a
plaintiffs claim that she had been injured by a solicitation to have
sex, although this court also denied recovery.22 2 In that case, a
married woman alleged that she was sitting near the window in her
house when the defendant approached and proposed that she have
sexual intercourse with him.22 3 She claimed "that she indignantly
refused the proposal" and suffered fright, humiliation, mortification, and shame from the incident.22 4 Apparently, the defendant
did not enter the plaintiffs house or come within physical reach of
her person. 22 5 The complaint was dismissed because
it did not meet
22
the traditional requirements for an assault.
On appeal, the majority of the court characterized the case as
presenting the "novel" issue of whether a cause of action will lie in
favor of a woman against a man who solicits her to have sexual
intercourse with him.22 7 Two legal arguments in favor of recovery
seemed most plausible to this turn-of-the-century court. The first
was whether a solicitation to have sex ought to be treated as
equivalent to charging a woman with lack of chastity, even if it
did not technically amount to a libel. 22 ' The argument hinged on
viewing the solicitation itself as offensive and harmful because it
implied that the plaintiff was the kind of woman who might accept
the offer and thereby impugned her reputation for sexual propriety.
This libel-sounding argument, however, did not persuade the
court, which drew a distinction between accusations of unchastity
and sexual advances. In the court's view, "the defendant did not
accuse the plaintiff of the want of chastity, but showed a purpose to
seduce her from the path of virtue. 22 9 Interestingly, the court did
not quarrel with the fact that women who had been solicited to have
sex might suffer anguish and humiliation from being so approached.
Instead, it denied recovery because it was unwilling to recognize a
claim solely for women based on male sexual overtures, and refused
to endorse a more universal cause of action. To support its ruling,
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Reed v. Maley, 74 S.W. 1079, 1080 (Ky. 1903).
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1080-81.

2158

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:2115

the court reversed the gender roles and offered the following
hypothetical case:
Suppose a bawd should solicit a man upon a public street to
have sexual intimacy with her; he certainly could not maintain
a civil action against her. If an action could be maintained by a
woman against a man for such solicitation, the same right to
maintain one would exist in his favor.... [even ifl he might not
suffer the same anguish and humiliation on account of such
solicitation as the woman .... "
Thus, the court did not premise its denial of recovery on the view
that there was no harm in asking, but on the narrower notion that
this particular gender-related harm should not be recognized in
law. It did not explain, however, why framing any new emotional
distress tort in a gender-neutral way was necessary, especially
tort doctrines that
given then-prevailing rules of libel and other
231
sometimes limited recovery to one sex only.
The court also rejected the argument that recovery was justified
because solicitation to have sex amounted to the common law
offense of solicitation to commit adultery.2 32 Under this theory,
permitting a tort action would perform the dual function of
reinforcing the criminal law while compensating for the special
harm suffered by the plaintiff, much in the same way that allowing
a tort action for battery reinforces criminal proscriptions against
the same act. Although the majority was unpersuaded, 33 a dissenting judge was attracted to the theory, particularly because he
viewed adultery as "a grave offense under the moral law" 234 and
regarded soliciting sex from a married woman as an attack on "[t]he

230. Id. at 1081.
231. See Pruitt, supra note 152, at 968.
232. Reed, 74 S.W. at 1081.
233. The court reasoned that because there was no statute against adultery, a tort cause
of action could not be implied from a statute. Id. The court indicated that even though the
plaintiff might have suffered special damage as a result of the defendant's conduct, in
addition to the public harm caused by adultery, she could not recover because there was no
preexisting tort cause of action encompassing her claim. Id. at 1081-82. The court
distinguished the case from cases of felonious intent to convert property and cases of assault,
which carried both criminal and tort sanctions. Id. at 1081.
234. Id. at 1083 (Hobson, J., dissenting).
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purity of woman and the sanctity of the marriage relation. 23 5
Echoing traditional rationales for recognizing the tort of assault,
the dissent worried that if a cause of action were not granted in
solicitation cases, it would "leave[] such offenses to be punished
wholly by the relatives of the injured woman," and would lead to
"bloodshed and disregard of the law itself."23' 6 Additionally, like the
majority, the dissent did not question the genuineness of the
woman's injury in solicitation cases. Far from believing that there
was no harm in asking, the court thought that "[t]he natural effect
of an indecent proposal ... would be to" make a virtuous woman as
"sick as the administration of a nauseate drug," and render her
her domestic duties. 237
"unfit for discharging ...
Despite these early rejections of claims premised on sexual
solicitations, some later courts did allow plaintiffs to recover,
particularly when there was something special in the facts of the
case, relating either to the vulnerability of the plaintiff or the
aggravated nature of the defendant's conduct. Thus, in 1934, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas allowed a pregnant woman to recover
after being accosted by a man who offered her money if she would
"be a friend" to him and warned that her husband might suspect
she had done something wrong if she told him about the incident.2 38
Similarly, a Georgia appellate court in 1948 upheld a suit against
a bill collector who directed abusive and profane language against
the
a pregnant plaintiff and threatened "that if he couldn't get
2 39
money any other way he was going to 'take it out in trade.'
By the early 1960s, however, the courts seemed pretty much
inclined to accept Prosser's view that, absent other evidence of
"extreme and outrageous" conduct, there was indeed no harm in
asking. One gauge of how far courts had come from earlier days of
professed concern for the mental sensibilities of women is evident
in the 3-2 decision of the Supreme Court of Utah in Samms v.
Eccles,240 a case involving obscene phone calls and, by today's
standards, stalking. The plaintiff in Samms alleged that, for a
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1084.
Erwin v. Milligan, 67 S.W.2d 592, 593-94 (Ark. 1934).
Digsby v. Carroll Baking Co., 47 S.E.2d 203, 205, 208 (Ga. Ct. App. 1948).
358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961).
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period of approximately seven months, the defendant repeatedly
called her on the phone at all hours, including late at night, and
solicited her to have sex with him.2 41 On one occasion, he showed up
at her house "and made an indecent exposure of his person. 24 2 In
her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that she was "a respectable
married woman" who regarded the proposals as insulting and
obscene, and that she feared for her personal safety. 243 The trial
court244dismissed her complaint, for failure to allege an actionable
tort.

The majority of the Utah Supreme Court in Simms did allow
the claim to proceed and generally endorsed the Restatement's
"outrageousness" approach to the intentional infliction tort. 245 But
the court made clear that, in less aggravated cases, "solicitation
to sexual intercourse would not be actionable even though it may
be offensive to the offeree. 2 46 Citing Magruder's "no harm in
asking,, 241 the court declared that the law assumed that most
cases of solicitation were harmless and wryly characterized the
behavior as "a custom of long standing and one which in all
likelihood will continue. 2 4 The two dissenting justices would have
denied the plaintiff any remedy. In their view, because the defendant's repeated conduct was for the avowed purpose of inducing the
plaintiff to have sexual relations with him, it could not form the
basis of a claim.24 9 In other words, if the motive was sex, the dissent
thought it should be treated solely as "a moral, rather than a legal
250
or actionable, wrong.
By the middle of the twentieth century, most courts and the
leading commentator thus treated solicitation cases as exceptional and were content to excise them from the emerging tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The earlier view that
sometimes linked solicitation to have sex to a libel-like claim for
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 345.

at 346-47 & n.14.
at 347.
at 347 n.15.
at 347-48 (Callister, J., dissenting).
at 348.
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impugning a woman's virtue disappeared from the case law and left
plaintiffs with no specific legal arguments to support recovery, save
an allegation that defendants conduct was outrageous in the
particular case. Moreover, in Prosser's conception of the new tort,
the cause of action of intentional infliction was designed to fill a
specified gap within tort law, namely, to provide recovery in cases
of extreme behavior that justifiably caused severe mental distress
to victims. Before the era of civil rights, there was no special
concern for gender neutrality in the application of tort rules.
Indeed, both the courts and Prosser thought it appropriate to
consider the gender and any resulting vulnerability of the plaintiff
in determining both the egregiousness of the defendant's behavior
and the likelihood that it would cause severe distress. However,
when it came to solicitations of sex, Prosser and the courts were
unwilling to view male sexual initiative as either extreme conduct
or the type of conduct that would reasonably cause a woman severe
distress.
The story told thus far of the intentional infliction tort makes no
mention of race and how it affected the courts' understanding of
what qualified as outrageous or extreme behavior. Indeed, with
one notable exception, the solicitation of sex cases analyzed by
Magruder and Prosser all involved white plaintiffs and, although
cast in general terms, necessarily triggered cultural stereotypes
and understandings of white womanhood of the era. In the one
early case Prosser discussed that involved a black woman's claim,25 '
he was even more resistant to permitting recovery and sadly
mischaracterized the facts of the case. The case involved an
allegation of rape by a porter on an interstate railway.25 2 Cora
Scruggs "was the only passenger in the women's compartment of
the colored coach. 2 5 3 She claimed that while she was on the
midnight train leaving from Memphis, "the porter made indecent
proposals to her, offer[ed] her money and attempt[ed] familiarity
with her person."25 4 She testified that she refused his advances, but
that just before the train reached its destination, the porter
confronted her coming out of the lavatory, pushed her back into the
251.
252.
253.
254.

Dickinson v. Scruggs, 242 F. 900 (6th Cir. 1917).
Id. at 901.
Id.

Id.
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room, and forcibly raped her there, despite her active resistance.2 5
She alleged that her back was badly injured as a result. 5 ' When
she sued in 1917, courts embraced what was then known as the
"common carrier" rule, which allowed recovery against railroads for
gross insults and offensive behavior by railroad employees.2 57 This
special tort doctrine provided recovery for nonphysical injuries,
even if the defendant's conduct could not be classified as outrageous
or extreme.2 58
Scruggs won her jury trial for "assault" and was awarded $1800
in damages. 25 9 The trial court directed a verdict on liability in her
favor because it regarded Scruggs's testimony as essentially
uncontradicted.26 ° Tellingly, the porter who had allegedly raped the
plaintiff did not testify. 26 1 In its defense, the railroad tried to prove
that "plaintiff [had] yielded for a consideration," based solely on the
testimony of a different porter who had spoken with the plaintiff on
the return trip back to Memphis.2 62 Over the plaintiffs denials, he
testified that Scruggs told him that she had given in to the porter
because she was afraid of him and added that the porter never paid
her the $10 and breakfast he had promised and that she would
make the company pay for it. 263 By this testimony, the railroad
hoped to show the plaintiff to be a loose woman or prostitute who
had agreed to have sex for money.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed Scruggs's award and
ordered a new trial. 26 4 Because it viewed the testimony of the porter
on the return trip as contradicting the plaintiff s testimony, it ruled
that the issue of liability should have been submitted to the jury.26 5
Most importantly, the appellate court rejected the trial court's view
that, even standing alone, the "improper advances" made to the
plaintiff while she was a passenger in the defendant's car would be
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
Id.
See Prosser, supra note 185, at 59-64.
Id. at 61-62.
Scruggs, 242 F. at 901.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 902.
Id.
Id.
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enough to sustain the verdict. 6 It disagreed with the trial court's
view that the solicitations by the porter were actionable, even if the
plaintiff eventually submitted to him and even if she were offered
money for her submission.
For the appellate court, the plaintiff could not recover if it turned
out that she submitted to intercourse, not out of fear alone, but also
for money. It held that "lascivious proposals, if later voluntarily
accepted, would not create liability upon defendant's part."2 ' Its
holding implicitly endorsed the view that, in this case, there was no
harm in asking, the plaintiffs fear notwithstanding. The court did
not mention the common carrier doctrine that allowed recovery for
insults and offensive behavior.
In Insult and Outrage, Prosser referenced Scruggs in his
discussion of the "no harm in asking" doctrine and in support of the
majority view that solicitation for sex does not lead to liability. 8
However, Prosser apparently misread the appellate court's opinion
as containing a finding that Cora Scruggs had voluntarily agreed to
have sex, rather than as a contested case in which the issue should
have gone to the jury. In a footnote to Scruggs, Prosser stated that
"[i]t is worthy of note that there is at least one case in which the
lady accepted the invitation and then sued for the insult."26 9 He did
not remark on the race of the plaintiff, nor did he discuss how the
case might relate to the common carrier doctrine.
Prosser's casual and perhaps intentionally humorous mention of
Scruggs is disturbing to the contemporary eye because it appears to
play into pernicious stereotypes of black women as promiscuous
by nature and thereby "unrapable."'2 7 Prosser apparently misinterpreted the court's opinion as determining that Scruggs was a loose
woman who had the impertinence to sue when her "customer" did
not pay up. His cursory classification of the case as one in which
an "invitation" was "accepted" gave no hint that the plaintiff had
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id.
Id.
Prosser, supra note 185, at 46 n.33.
Id.
See Nell Irvin Painter, Hill, Thomas, and the Use of Racial Stereotype, in RACE-ING

JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE

CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 200, 209-10 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (discussing the
stereotype of the "oversexed-black-Jezebel"); Jennifer Wriggins, Note, Rape, Racism, and the
Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 117-23 (1983).
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alleged that she had been raped, that her account had been believed
by the trial court, and that the alleged rapist never appeared to
give testimony for the defense.27 ' Prosser's classification of the
case effectively erased the plaintiffs uncontradicted allegations
of fear and coercion and greatly minimized her injury. Although it
is possible to read the case as simple support for the proposition
that the courts believed that there was no harm in asking, Prosser
seemed to go further by using the case as a warning that some
unscrupulous plaintiffs may attempt to misuse the infliction tort
for their own economic gain. Prosser's hostile reading of Scruggs
suggests that the plaintiffs race can affect one's understanding of
the offensive nature of the "solicitation" and might further decrease
the chances of prevailing when an intentional infliction claim is
brought by an African American woman.
Like most legal commentators in the pre-Civil Rights Era,
Prosser did not offer a critique of how race affected judicial
treatment of claims for emotional distress. Instead, he took the
more "neutral" position of noticing race as merely one of several
cultural factors that might enter into the decision-making process
of courts-in particular, southern courts-when they assessed the
quality of a defendant's conduct.2 72 Prosser treated segregation as
a fact of life and noted that a defendant could not be "liable for
doing no more than he has the legal privilege to do, even though he
may do it with very bad manners, and in doing it cause acute
mental distress."2 7' 3 He reported that in the absence of some
applicable state civil rights statute, there could be no liability for
refusing to admit a black person to a school, restaurant, or shop.2 74
Recovery for the wounded pride and humiliation of excluded
minorities was not cognizable under existing law and customs that
sanctioned such discriminatory treatment. However, Prosser was
aware that many courts did recognize and place a value on white
racial privilege. He noted that, pursuant to the common carrier
rule, white plaintiffs had recovered for their distress at being put

271.
272.
273.
274.

See supra text accompanying notes 251-63.
See Prosser, supra note 185, at 49-50.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 50.
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in a Jim Crow car, characterizing such conduct as a "gross" insult
"of a kind highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man."27' 5
The racial double standard of pre-Civil Rights Era common law
courts can be seen by comparing Scruggs with a 1905 "common
carrier" decision from a Texas appellate court involving a claim for
insult by a white female plaintiff.27 6 The case arose from an incident
in the "ladies' waiting room" of a railway station, reserved at that
time for white women, their children, and their white male
escorts. 27 7 The incident occurred when one of Mrs. Luther's children
spilled water from a cup onto the floor. Luther, a white married
woman, claimed that the black female attendant insulted her by
insinuating that her child had purposefully spilled the water and
that the attendant had looked at Luther in a "vicious and angry"
manner. 27 Mrs. Luther alleged that she was afraid of the attendant
and suffered great mental distress as a result of the disturbing
encounter. 279 The appellate court upheld a $2500 jury verdict,
reaffirming the common carrier doctrine that entitled the plaintiff
to be "treated with respect and kindness. 2 ° In striking contrast to
Scruggs, Luther's allegations of fear and distress were not erased
or diminished. In this case, white racial privilege served to validate
her claim of injury and justify an award, despite the fact that she
suffered no physical assault or direct physical harm.28 '
Seen through a lens of gender and race, the history of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress tort presents a picture
of limited protection against intentionally cruel and offensive
behavior, largely reflective of dominant cultural attitudes toward
women and racial minorities. Before the Civil Rights Era, courts
were willing to use the new tort to protect "respectable" women
against conduct that threatened their reputation for sexual
propriety and moral rectitude. By expanding the protection of the
law to cover false allegations of immorality that could not be proven
275. Id. at 59, 62.
276. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Luther, 90 S.W. 44 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905); see Jennifer B.
Wriggins, Toward a Feminist Revision of Torts, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 139,
143-48 (2005) (discussing Luther).
277. Luther, 90 S.W. at 45.
278. Id. at 46.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 48.
281. Id.

2166

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:2115

to cause economic harm, for example, courts used the emerging tort
to reinforce prevailing standards of moral purity and to redress
"wounded female honor"2 8' 2 in cases in which women claimed that
they were inaccurately portrayed as whores. Seen in this way, tort
law helped to police what historian Judith Walkowitz describes as
the boundary between "the fallen and the virtuous" and to assure
women in the
latter category did not suffer in "[c]ases of mistaken
283
identity.

The limited protection afforded female chastity and honor,
however, did not generally extend to women who claimed that male
solicitation of sex caused them harm. Early cases did not perceive
the potential for coercion, threat, or pressure behind such solicitations, and tended to treat them uncritically as mere offers or
invitations that plaintiffs were free to accept or refuse. Either
way, there was generally no recovery. The Catch-22 logic of the
traditionalist sexual ideology played out in this way: if a woman
accepted the solicitation, she proved she was not respectable and
did not deserve legal protection; if she rejected the solicitation, she
established herself as respectable, but could not be heard to
complain that she suffered cognizable harm by being required to do
so. In effect, when courts refused to regard offensive solicitations,
without more, as actionable behavior, they placed a higher value on
male sexual initiative than on female injury in cases of "mistaken
identity," and required respectable women to prove their virtue in
everyday encounters. Only in cases involving pregnant plaintiffs or
other aggravating circumstances did courts occasionally provide a
civil remedy, acknowledge harm stemming from a "mere" solicitation for sex, and thus implicitly exempt such women from the
burden of resistance.
Not surprisingly, the early cases did not use the intentional
infliction tort as a means to protect an individual woman's sexual
autonomy or right to self-determination. The courts were not
inclined to plumb the facts of a case to see whether a woman
"welcomed" the particular sexual advance or whether particular
attentions were "unwanted," to borrow from the vocabulary of
282. Judith R. Walkowitz, Going Public:Shopping, Street Harassment,and Streetwalking
in Late Victorian London, 62 REPRESENTATIONS 1, 9 (1998).
283. Id. at 7.
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contemporary sexual harassment law. For the most part, tort law
reflected what Orit Kamir describes as an "honor culture," a
cultural system highly dependent on one's relative standing in
society in which "reputation is all."2" In such cultures, Kamir
explains, a person's honor "can be easily lost through the slightest
social error, or stolen by another," and requires "specific, daily
(sometimes ritualistic) behavior" to police the boundary between the
honorable and the disreputable.2 8 In the early days of the infliction
tort, the assumption seemed to be that although virtuous women
would, by definition, be offended by sexual overtures, men should
nevertheless be given leeway to test the virtue of women, at least
to some degree. 2 6 This simple equation did not allow much room to
investigate the meaning to be ascribed to the "solicitation" in
question-whether it was a display of power, a sign of disrespect,
or a show of affection--or even whether the defendant's conduct
could fairly be described as a solicitation of sex. Nor did it lead
courts to question the validity of the madonna/whore dichotomy
that attempted to lock women's identities into stagnant sexual
categories.
By the early 1960s, moreover, the leeway given to defendants in
solicitation cases expanded considerably, as the notion that
respectable women were offended by sexual solicitations came to
seem quaint. The earlier view that had linked solicitations to
have sex to a libel-like claim for impugning a woman's virtue
disappeared, without yet being replaced by a new understanding
of the dignitary harms that could be caused by aggressive sexual
conduct. At this point in the pre-Civil Rights Era, the intentional
infliction tort provided a "safe haven" for male sexual initiative.
In its early days, the abuses of power addressed by the infliction
tort did not encompass the power of white racial privilege. The
infliction tort provided little protection against severe emotional
distress inflicted by racist behavior, nor was it used to recognize the
extreme vulnerability of racial minorities to suffering at the hands
of whites. During this period, the protection against racial insult or
284. ORIT KAMIR, FRAMED: WOMEN IN LAW AND FILM 6 (2006).

285. Id. at 9. Kamir asserts that "[iln honor cultures, honor serves as an effective
disciplinary tool, and the behavioral code under which members achieve and maintain honor

is, therefore, a structure of social power." Id. at 7.
286. See Walkowitz, supra note 282, at 7.
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race-based humiliation was more likely to be afforded to white
rather than minority plaintiffs. The mantle of respectability that
allowed some white women to claim protection against emotional
distress was typically denied to women of color, in line with
prevailing racial stereotypes of black women as promiscuous by
nature and impervious to sexualized injury. On issues of race, tort
law tended to reinforce white supremacy by providing white
claimants damages for the "outrage" of being treated with insufficient deference by black attendants or for mistakenly being
assigned to a "colored" facility. Until the injustice of racial hierarchy was challenged by the civil rights movement, few recognized
that discriminatory treatment of racial minorities might qualify as
intolerable and outrageous conduct and form the basis of a tort
claim for emotional distress. Before civil rights, tort law was more
engaged in vindicating wounded feelings of white racial pride than
in compensating for harms of racial subordination.
IV. REFORMING TORT LAW AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS

Given the historical limitations of the infliction tort, it is not
surprising that when Catharine MacKinnon and other activists first
agitated for a legal remedy for sexual harassment in the mid- 1970s,
they steered clear of tort law.2 7 MacKinnon crafted her legal
argument for a civil rights remedy for harassment at a time when
courts were rejecting plaintiffs' Title VII harassment claims as
beyond the scope of the statute and suggesting that any relief
should come from tort law."' Importantly, MacKinnon set out to
demonstrate that tort law was no substitute for a civil rights
remedy and did not focus on the question whether recovery should
be located in both domains.2 89
MacKinnon's case for a civil rights remedy for sexual harassment was predicated on what she regarded as the fundamental
inadequacy of tort law to redress systemic harms of sexual

287. See MACKINNON, supra note 31, at 164-74.
288. Id. at 164 ("[S]everal recent sexual harassment cases have suggested-usually as a
reason for holding sexual harassment not to be sex discrimination-that sexual harassment

should be considered tortious.").
289. Id. at 171-74.
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coercion.2 9 ° She saw a need for legal protection specifically linked to
sex discrimination, arguing that tort law inevitably missed the crux
of the "group-defined injury which occurs to many different
individuals regardless of unique qualities or circumstances, in ways
that connect with other deprivations of the same individuals, among
all of whom a single characteristic-female sex-is shared."2 9' 1
By locating sexual harassment claims under Title VII-with its
required nexus to sex-MacKinnon hoped to redirect the law away
' of tort law
from the "disabling (and cloying) moralism"2 92
to a more
equality-centered jurisprudence that comprehended harassment's
role in maintaining women's inferior status in the workplace.29 3
When MacKinnon's Sexual Harassment of Working Women was
published in 1979, the time was ripe for law reform centered around
identity-based concepts of discrimination, in line with the newly
acquired consciousness of the pervasiveness of sex discrimination
forged by the women's movement. Rather than try to remake tort
doctrines to accommodate sexual harassment claims, MacKinnon
thought it best to free sexual harassment from tort law, give it
its own name, and provide it a home in civil rights law.294 At the
time, there was little awareness or discussion of same-sex harassment or other forms of abusive conduct beyond the paradigmatic
male/female model of quid pro quo and hostile environment
harassment through which female employees were victimized by
male supervisors and coworkers.29 5 Proving that harassment was
based on sex was then seen as giving litigants an opportunity to
focus the law's attention in the right place, that is, on how women's
sexuality was used to force women out of jobs and deny them
promotions and other benefits of employment. For the most part,
feminist energies in the 1980s and early 1990s were poured into
296
establishing sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 172.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 2.
294. Id. at 173.
295. See CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE
REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 25-26 (2000) (describing evolution of quid pro
quo and hostile environment harassment claims).
296. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 237-45 (2d ed.
2003) (discussing feminist critiques of Title VII doctrine in harassment cases).
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Concern for the difficulty of addressing other forms of harassment
under the status bound scheme of civil rights law tended to surface
with the
only later, after courts and scholars began struggling
2 97
VII.
Title
under
discrimination"
"sex
of
definition
An early argument for revising tort law to address harassment
on a more universal basis, however, came from Regina Austin in
her 1988 article, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort
2 9 The article was
of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
prescient in identifying multidimensional harassment as a major
problem that tort law should target. Austin was mainly concerned
with abuse suffered by low-income workers that disproportionately
affected racial and ethnic minorities.2 99 She described how the law
imposed few penalties on supervisors who routinely intimidated
and ridiculed workers under their control, provided only that they
refrained from doing so in transparently racial or sexual terms."'
She maintained that because class oppression was not included
among Title VII's prohibited bases, supervisory "[m]istreatment
that would never be tolerated if it were undertaken openly in the
name of white supremacy or male patriarchy is readily justified by
the privilege of status, class, or color of collar."' 0 '
Austin was not sanguine about the prospects for meaningful tort
reform, given her view that tort relief had so far been limited to
"the extraordinary, the excessive, and the nearly bizarre in the way
of supervisory intimidation."' ' She was not willing to give up
completely on tort law, however, because of its distinctive capacity
to create a norm of respectful treatment by supervisors premised on
the dignity of all workers. Her article was one of the first to show
how multidimensional harassment could fall through the cracks of
297. See Charles R. Calleros, The Meaningof "Sex" Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment
Under Title VII, 20 VT. L. REV. 55 (1995); L. Camille H~bert, Sexual Harassment as
Discrimination'2ecause of... Sex'" Have We Come Full Circle?, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 439
(2001); Ramona L. Paetzold, Same-sex Sexual Harassment:Can It Be Sex-related for Purposes
of Title VII?, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. PoL'Y J. 25 (1997); David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because
of Sex? The CausationProblem in Sexual HarassmentLaw, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (2002).
298. Austin, supra note 32.
299. Id. at 3-4.
300. Id. at 8-12.
301. Id. at 4.
302. Id. at 18. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 45 cmt. c (Council Draft No. 6, 2006) (noting that defendant's conduct
must be "extreme" in the sense of "sufficiently unusuar' to be actionable).
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Title VII and how "racism and sexism obscure and are obscured by
the perniciousness of class oppression. ' ' 3 Later scholars would
expand on Austin's identification of a class "loophole" under Title
VII, and analyze how the omission of sexual orientation as a
prohibited basis for discrimination under Title VII insulated sexinflected forms of discrimination from civil rights coverage and
operated as another loophole against liability for harassment in the
workplace. °4
The arguments MacKinnon and Austin first presented set the
stage for contemporary scholarly debates about the virtues of
status-based versus universal approaches to harassment. Reflecting
MacKinnon's legacy, there is still skepticism that tort law is so
inherently individualistic and tied to outmoded gender ideologies
that attempts to reshape it along civil rights lines are bound to be
futile.3 "5 However, as the limitations of status-based civil rights
protection have been realized in recent years, legal commentators
have shown a renewed interest in universalism. °6 Now that the
Title VII claim for harassment looks firmly enough established so
that it will not be eliminated, the debate has shifted to what
supplemental protection torts might provide and how the norms of
tort law might be influenced by civil rights. 0 7 The recent calls for
reform are tempered, however, by a realization of the limits of law
to effect cultural change, especially in the minefield of gender and
racial politics. 0 8
Oddly enough, the case in favor of migration of civil rights to tort
law derives from both the positive and negative aspects of current
303. Austin, supranote 32, at 4.
304. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the
Conflation of "Sex," "Gender,"and "Sexual Orientation"inEuro-American Law and Society,
83 CAL. L. REv. 1, 147 (1995).
305. See particularly Ann Scales, Nooky Nation: On Tort Law and OtherArguments from
Nature, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 158, at 307, 309-12.
306. See Orit Kamir, Dignity,Respect, and Equality in Israel's Sexual HarassmentLaw,
in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 158, at 561, 565; supra note 33. See
generallyAnita Bernstein, TreatingSexual Harassmentwith Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445
(1997) (proposing more universal dignity-oriented standards within civil rights law).
307. See generally Ehrenreich, supra note 33 (advocating a pluralistic approach to
remedying workplace discrimination).
308. See Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1539, 1544-59 (1997) (discussing disinclination of courts to recognize novel tort claims not
solidly grounded in established precedents).
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civil rights law. The positive side consists of identifying innovative
aspects of Title VII harassment law worthy of importing to torts. °9
The idea is that if the concept of outrage is to evolve in a way that
captures some of worst forms of injustice and intentional injury, it
should be linked to the most current understandings of equality
and nondiscriminatory treatment. The negative side highlights the
current limitations of Title VII, as interpreted by unreceptive
federal judges intent on holding the line on coverage. It focuses on
the need to provide redress for egregious cases of harassment that
fall through the cracks of Title VII categories.310
In large part due to the development of the hostile environment
claim, tort law now has something to borrow to give meaning to
outrageous conduct in intentional infliction cases. In some respects,
the development of Title VII sexual harassment law in the last
thirty years has been remarkable, contributing to a transformation
inthe way sexualized conduct in the workplace is understood and
evaluated, at least in some quarters.1
Simply put, the emergence of sexual harassment law has
challenged the belief that there is no harm in asking. The entire
body of sexual harassment law is premised on the view that
solicitations for sex and other sexualized conduct in the workplace
can produce harm, most notably in instances when they are backed
by economic coercion or pressure or serve to reinforce the subordinate status of a group of workers.3 1 2 In marked contrast to the
attitude of early torts cases that presumed that women were always
free to accept or refuse sexual solicitations, 1 3 sexual harassment
law now recognizes how disparities in power and status can produce
offers that cannot be refused and can construct unequal working
conditions for targeted workers. This deprivatization of the injury
of sexual harassment and separation of sexual harassment from the
category of consensual sex was the pivotal move toward legal
recognition of the claim under Title VII. The change in vocabulary

309. Ehrenreich, supra note 33, at 39.
310. Fisk, supra note 33, at 83-85.
311. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Afterword, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT

LAW, supra note 158, at 672.
312. See MACKINNON, supra note 31, at 33-55.
313. See supra notes 216-33 and accompanying text.
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from "solicitation" to "harassment" effectively conveys the distance
traveled, from harmless offer to form of abuse.
In evaluating the importance of these developments for tort
law, three innovations of Title VII harassment law stand out.
They relate to the dynamic character of harassment as a pattern
of abusive conduct, to its plastic or multipurpose nature, and to
the incorporation of perspectival approaches for determining the
existence and severity of the harm imposed.
The first innovation goes to the heart of the concept of a hostile
environment. From the beginning, courts were careful to point out
that not every instance or incident of harassment was actionable
under Title VII. 314 The requirement that plaintiffs prove that the
' as a key element of
harassing conduct was "severe or pervasive"3 15
the claim was meant not only to screen out less serious cases, but
to ensure that the defendant's conduct had altered the "terms,
conditions or privileges of employment," as stated in the statutory
language.1 ' Recurring conduct that met the threshold requirement for severity or pervasiveness was said to amount to a
constructive term or condition of work, of equal significance to the
explicit terms and conditions set by the employer.31 7 Importantly,
this conceptualization of the claim made the employment-related
harms of harassment more visible, by focusing on how seemingly
personal everyday interactions can add up to a deterioration of the
working environment for some employees, which is not qualitatively
different from other work-related disadvantages, such as lower
pay or failures to promote. The claim also presupposes that informal power of supervisors and coworkers may sometimes be as
harmful as the deployment of formal power,3 1 an acknowledgment
that pushes the law a bit closer to the social realities that face
subordinated workers. Under Title VII law, harassment has been
reenvisioned as a recurring feature or condition of work-a dynamic
314. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
315. Id.
316. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (prohibiting "discriminat[ion] against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin").
317. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 66.
318. Susan D. Carle, Acknowledging Informal Power Dynamics in the Workplace: A
Proposalfor FurtherDevelopment of the Vicarious Liability Doctrinein Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment Cases, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 85, 104-06 (2006).
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pattern of behavior-rather than discrete acts of sexual solicitations. By definition, the hostile environment claim recognizes that
the sum may be worse than its parts when it comes to harassment,
and that context is all important.
The second innovation of hostile environment/harassment law
is a newfound appreciation for how harassment can be used to
accomplish different ends. A common theme in the cases and
scholarship has been that sexual harassment in the workplace is
not always or principally an expression of sexual desire or sexual
attraction, 31 9 but can also serve a number of other purposes
related to maintaining hierarchy in the workplace. Harassment
can function as a tool of workplace segregation by discouraging
women from taking "men's jobs,"32 as a way of reinforcing the
power of abusive supervisors, and as a means of policing gender
norms and preserving the gendered character of the job itself.3 21
This attention to how harassment can operate as means of subordination prevents minimizing the harm and opens up the range of
potential injuries beyond the realm of hurt feelings or annoyances.
It encourages litigants and courts to examine how harassers'
reliance on sex, race, or other social identities of the targets can
deepen the wound and become an especially effective way to
ostracize, demean, and demoralize. The plasticity of harassment
also suggests that the seriousness of a defendant's conduct cannot
be judged abstractly apart from its effects.
The third innovation of harassment law of potential relevance to
tort law is the incorporation of perspective into the analysis of the
harmful quality of the conduct in question. The staple of the
"reasonable person" standard has undergone considerable reworking in the Title VII case law. 22 In determining doctrinal questions,
such as whether conduct is "unwelcome," or whether it should be
regarded as "severe or pervasive," some courts have been receptive
to a "multiple perspectives" approach that acknowledges that the
meaning of an action may differ, depending on the perspective from
319. See L. Camille H~bert, The Economic ImplicationsofSexual Harassmentfor Women,
KAN. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 41, Spring 1994, at 47-50.
320. See Vicki Schultz, ReconceptualizingSexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1687
(1998).
321. See Franke, supra note 173, at 693.
322. See FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 295, at xvii-xxii.
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which the action is viewed. To varying degrees, the cases have
taken into account the social position of both the harasser and the
target to assess the seriousness of the challenged behavior,
considering, for example, the fact that the plaintiff was the only
woman in a male-dominated working group when deciding whether
hazing and taunting is actionable.3 2' Although there is still no
consensus about the particular standpoint that ought to govern in
Title VII harassment cases-as evidenced by the continuing debate
over use of a "reasonable woman" standard32 4 -the relevance of the
victim's perspective has clearly gained ground. In addition to
attending to the "totality of the circumstances" in a particular case,
room has been cleared for factfinders to consider the background
social identities of the actors and power dynamics at the workplace
before they decide whether actionable harm has occurred.
These innovations could be transported to tort law to help make
the transition from an honor-based to a dignity-based concept of
outrageous conduct. In the early intentional infliction cases, the
severity of sexualized conduct directed at women was judged by its
capacity to sully the reputation of a respectable woman. 25 Under a
dignity-based system informed by civil rights, the inquiry would
shift to whether the defendant's conduct, as a whole, had the effect
of seriously harming the plaintiff by targeting her as a second-class
employee who did not deserve to be treated with equal respect and
consideration. Under this approach, the discriminatory aspect of the
harassment is part of what qualifies it as outrageous conduct and
323. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409, 2415-16 (2006)
(adopting a reasonable person standard in plaintiffs position as the standard for retaliation
cases, and noting that plaintiff was the only woman in her department). Justice Alto's
concurring opinion stated that the Court's standard suggested that some of plaintiff's
individual characteristics-including "age, gender, and family responsibilities"-would be
taken into account in considering the case from a person in plaintiffs position. Id. at 2421
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). In assessing equality claims, Canadian courts are
committed to a perspectival approach that assesses the purpose and effect of a challenged
law or action from the perspective of the claimant. "The relevant point of view is not solely
that of a 'reasonable person,' but that of a 'reasonable person, dispassionate and fully
apprised of the circumstances, possessed of similar attributes to, and under similar
circumstances as, the group of which the rights claimant is a member...." Halpern v. Canada
(Att'y Gen.), [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161, 183 (Ont. C.A.).
324. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 296, at 242-45 (discussing the debate over a reasonable
woman standard).
325. See supratext accompanying notes 196-237.
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sets it apart from less virulent forms of incivility, rudeness, or
disrespect.
The kind of transition from honor to dignity I envision in the concept of outrageous conduct is similar to the approach of Canadian
law, which has successfully woven equality principles into its
fundamental notion of human dignity. Canadian courts see equal
treatment as an essential component of human dignity, in contrast
to the dominant approach in the United States that tends to
separate the two concepts, assigning to civil rights the task of
protecting equality, while tort law is assigned to protect dignitary
interests. Thus, the Canadian Supreme Court has defined human
dignity along civil rights lines by declaring that
[h]uman dignity means that an individual or group feels selfrespect and self-worth. It is concerned with physical and
psychological integrity and empowerment. Human dignity is
harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or
circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits. It is enhanced by laws which are sensitive to the
needs, capacities, and merits of different individuals, taking into
account the context underlying their differences. Human dignity
is harmed when individuals and groups are marginalized,
ignored, or devalued ....326
Under the Canadian vision of human dignity, it is far easier to
characterize persistent racial, sexual, or other group-based forms
of harassment as serious harms that warrant protection under both
statutory and common law.
In addition to capturing a larger number of harassment cases
also actionable under Title VII, revising the tort of outrage along
civil rights lines could also provide redress in some cases that
currently fall outside the Title VII categories. As Title VII has

326. Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 530
(Can.); Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 161; see also ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTMSM,
LAWYERING, & LEGAL THEORY 74-76 (2006) (discussing the Canadian vision of equality). For
discussions of dignity-based approaches to harassment in Japan and Europe, see Yukiko
Tsunoda, Sexual Harassmentin Japan,in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra
note 158, at 618, 618-26; Susanne Baer, Dignity or Equality? Responses to Workplace
Harassment in European, German and U.S. Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT
LAW, supra note 158, at 582, 582-95.
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matured, it has become increasingly complex and rigid. Compared
to the universal principles of tort law, Title VII is a status-based
or identity-based law, protecting only against discrimination based
on certain specified bases. Thus, there are perennial struggles over
what constitutes "sex-based" discrimination 27 or what qualifies as
discrimination based on race121 or national origin.32 9 Because
equally harmful and related forms of discrimination, such as
discrimination based on sexual orientation or language, are not
covered by Title VII,3"' litigators often attempt to shoehorn their
claims into one of the protected categories. Additionally, many
contemporary forms of bias are hard to fit under the traditional
Title VII categories. There is little space, for example, for same-sex
harassment, 33 1 multidimensional discrimination 331-such as raceand class-inflected claims-or discrimination against subgroups.
327. See supranote 297 and accompanying text.
328. See, e.g., Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(rejecting African American woman's race discrimination claim based on employer's
prohibition of braided hairstyles); Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the
Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 passim (discussing Rogers); see also
Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being "RegardedAs"
Black, And Why Title VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and JamalAre White, 2005 WiSC.
L. REv. 1283, 1283-84 (discussing discrimination against persons with black-sounding names
and voices).
329. See Fragante v. City & County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596-99 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that accent discrimination does not constitute discrimination based on national
origin).
330. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding employer's
English-only rule); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (ruling that
Title VII does not cover discrimination based on sexual orientation).
331. Although the Supreme Court opened the door for same-sex harassment claims in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), there is still great
uncertainty as to how plaintiffs in such cases can establish that their harassment was based
on sex. See generally Schwartz, supra note 297.
332. Courts often have difficulty dealing with "intersectional" claims in which it is
impossible to separate the different strands of discrimination, for example, when an
individual experiences distinctive discrimination as a low-income woman of color. See
generallyKimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender,and Sexual Harassment,65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467
(1992). Compare Austin, supra note 32, at 12-15, which discusses multidimensional
discrimination against workers.
333. Early on, the Supreme Court acknowledged that discrimination against subgroups
of a protected class is actionable under Title VII. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542, 543-44 (1971) (rejecting sex-plus doctrine). However, plaintiffs still have difficulty
proving discrimination when other members of the protected class are not targeted. See
Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructionsof Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual
and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 132 (1992) (discussing
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Title VII's focus on the victim's group status, moreover, makes it

difficult to reach bias directed at persons because of how they
example, the effeminate man 33 5 -or
against persons who refuse to cover their identity and resist
assimilation 336 -for example, the African American woman who
338
wears corn rows. 33 7 Although scholars such as Kathryn Abrams
have called for expanding the meaning of race and sex discrimination to reach such complex claims and complex claimants, for the
most part, the federal courts have not bought these arguments.3 9
Given the limitations of Title VII, not surprisingly there has been
a turn to tort law, in which plaintiffs are not required to pinpoint
the motivation behind their harassment or mistreatment in order
to recover. Tort law has the potential for reaching multidimensional
forms of harassment and harassment based on such categories as
sexual orientation, class, or language, not presently covered by Title
VII. The availability of tort law could prove particularly important,
for example, in a case of same-sex harassment in which one of the
forms of abuse consisted of forbidding the plaintiff from speaking
Spanish in the presence of the harasser. 340 To prevail on a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff in such a
case would be spared from having to establish that the harassment
was based on sex or national origin-and actionable under Title
VII-rather than being based on sexual orientation or language and
thus not covered by the federal law. Instead, the main focus in the
tort action would be on whether the defendant's conduct was
outrageous. Because tort law would permit plaintiffs to cumulate
incidents of different types of harassment, it could also relieve
women of color and other multiply burdened claimants from having
perform their identity 33 4-for

employers' use of testimony by nontargeted members of the protected class).
334. Carbado & Gulati, supranote 171, at 1293-98.
335. Mary Anne C. Case, DisaggregatingGender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:The
Effeminate Man in the Law and FeministJurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 31 (1995).
336. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002).
337. See supra note 328.
338. Seegenerally Kathryn Abrams, Complex Claimantsand Reductive Moral Judgments:

New Patterns in the Search for Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 337 (1996); Kathryn Abrams,
Title VIland the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479 (1994) [hereinafter Abrams,
Title VII].
339. See Abrams, Title VII, supra note 338, at 2493-502.
340. See Lucero-Nelson v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998)
(involving same-sex sexual harassment mixed with language discrimination).
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to split their identity and separate out conduct directed at them "as
women" from behavior taken against them on the basis of their race
or ethnicity.3 4 '
Tort law's potential benefits to harassment victims, of course, are
only speculative and depend largely on whether judges and juries
would regard defendants' conduct in such "complex" harassment
cases as outrageous, if freed from the constraints of the "gap filler"
approach to the infliction tort. MacKinnon's early reservation that,
in the hands of judges interpreting tort law, protection against
harassment might be stunted by traditional moralism and honorbased ideologies,3 4 2 remains a live issue, especially in same-sex
harassment cases or cases brought by plaintiffs who do not conform
to contemporary models of respectability.
Concerns about the possible "domestication" of harassment law,
however, extend beyond fears of judicial interpretation of tort
doctrines. After more than three decades of enforcement of Title
VII, it has become clear that conservative cultural forces can and
will influence the meanings placed on the law, regardless of
whether the claim carries the label of torts or civil rights. Thus, one
compelling complaint of feminist scholars is that enforcement of
sexual harassment law in everyday life can serve to reinscribe old
ideologies, rather than to empower women to resist discrimination.
For example, in her ethnography of an industrial electronics plant
in southern California, sociologist Beth Quinn explained how male
employees interpreted sexual harassment law mainly as a requirement to use "appropriate language" when they were in the presence
of "ladies," while retaining the traditional belief that any woman
343
who "put up with" crude behavior was, by inference, not a lady.
Quinn saw little evidence that the existence of sexual harassment
law operated as an incentive for women to resist sexist behavior in
this male-dominated workplace. Instead, most female employees
341. See Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539, 540 (discussing the
difficulty of splitting gender and racial identities).
342. See Martha C. Nussbaum, The Modesty of Mrs. Bajaj: India's ProblematicRoute to
Sexual Harassment Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 158, at

633, 646 ("[O]ffensiveness and outrage themselves look to the wrong core categories for
sexual harassment law.... The notion of outrage directs the mind only to grossness, and
possibly also to unwelcomeness.'); see also supra notes 289-96 and accompanying text.
343. See Beth A. Quinn, The Paradoxof Complaining: Law, Humor, and Harassmentin
the Everyday World, 25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 1151, 1166 (2000).

2180

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:2115

took a skeptical view of the benefits of sexual harassment law,
believing that filing a complaint was a risky and ineffectual tactic,
likely to reinforce their "outsider" status without appreciably
reducing the incidence of sex-based insults, demeaning "jokes,"
or physical aggression.3 4 4 When harassment law is seen in this
sobering light, it is easy to understand why most contemporary
feminists doubt that reform of harassment law will likely produce
immediate changes "on the ground." Instead, the focus tends to be
on the more modest goal of providing sufficient protection to those
few victims who decide to buck the conventional wisdom by
resorting to law.
Since MacKinnon first argued against using tort law to remedy
sexual harassment, the legal landscape has changed considerably.
There is now less concern that association with tort law will
contaminate sexual harassment law, especially given the danger
that the claim might well be stripped of its radical elements even
if it stays within Title VII. Instead, there is a growing sense that
locating harassment claims solely within civil rights law may now
serve to further marginalize the claim. Confined within civil rights,
it can look like a claim that has no place in the core curriculum,
describes only a particularized harm, and imposes only a special
statutory duty that does not reflect a widely shared social norm.
V. REFLECTIONS ON THE MIGRATION PROCESS

Currently, civil rights principles have migrated into torts to the
extent that tort law now operates as a modest supplement to civil
rights protection provided by state and federal statutes. Except in
those states that have preempted tort claims,3 45 tort law already
functions as more than a gap filler because it offers a remedy for
harassment and abuse in some cases when there are other sources
of legal redress. Interestingly, it is the perception of the intentional
infliction tort as a mere gap filler-and the correspondingly high
bar set for proving outrageousness-that has so far constrained
the migration and continued the separation of torts and civil
rights. In the minority of states that view the infliction tort as a
344. Id. at 1179.
345. See supra notes 109, 120 (listing twelve states total).
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reinforcement of civil rights, however, the concept of outrage is
incrementally being reshaped to encompass discriminatory treatment that simultaneously inflicts dignitary harm.34 In line with the
case-by-case approach to the intentional infliction tort, however,
courts have not yet articulated a theory regulating the intersection
of torts and civil rights beyond noting the important public policies
underlying civil rights law.
The most recent draft of the Third Restatement of Torts recognizes this supplementary role for the intentional infliction tort. In
addition to reciting the familiar language that the defendant's
conduct must go "beyond the bounds of human decency," and be
considered "intolerable in a civilized community,"34 7 the comments
to the Restatement indicate that the infliction tort plays some role
in the employment context. The primary focus of the Restatement
comments continues to underscore that the intentional infliction
tort is not intended to change the at-will employment doctrine
or interfere with management's prerogative to terminate such
employees. However, the limited migration approach of the new
Restatement does authorize a claim in cases where an employer
"goes so far beyond what is necessary to exercise the right [to fire
an at-will employee]" and "unnecessarily humiliates a fired employee."34 Most significantly, the latest draft contains a comment
explicitly mentioning harassment, the effect of civil rights law, and
the preemption controversy and indicates that common law courts
are free to apply the elements of the outrage tort in the employment
context and to provide relief for extreme and outrageous behavior
directed at employees.34 9 The Reporter's Note, addressing claims in
the employment context,3 5 ° cites to a law review article by Mark
Gergen, which stresses the "significant moral element" underlying
the infliction tort and expresses the view that the history of sexual
harassment "shows how the outrage standard allows new moral
values to be woven into the fabric of the common law. 35 ' In keeping
346. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
347. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSIcALAND EMOTIONAL HARM § 45

cmt. c (Council Draft No. 6, 2006).
348. Id. cmts. d & m (stating that "[n]othing in this Restatement provides any categorical
limitation to claims arising in the workplace").
349. Id. cmt. m.
350. See id. reporter's note cmt. d.
351. Mark P. Gergen, A GrudgingDefense of the Role of the CollateralTorts in Wrongful
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with its restating mission, the draft of the new Restatement does
not indicate a preference for the "gap filler" or "civil rights reinforcement" approach, but leaves that important question up to state
courts.3 5 2

With respect to the normative question of which approach states
should adopt, I do not believe that characterizing the infliction tort
as a "gap filler" is enough to decide the migration question. Calling
the infliction tort a "gap filler" seems only to beg the question of
whether there is a gap in tort law that should be filled. The history
of the infliction tort indicates that, as originally conceived, the tort
was viewed as filling an important gap or deficiency within tort
law to provide a remedy for serious, nonphysical injury caused
by behavior that seemed unquestionably immoral to judges."' 3
Tellingly, when the tort was developed, there was no discussion of
exempting certain behavior because it was already penalized by
some other body of law, such as criminal or regulatory law. Instead,
the "gap filler" description of the infliction tort seems to have arisen
in response to concerns that the malleable modern tort could
theoretically usurp or take over older particularized causes of
action, such as libel and battery, that protected interests other than
the interest in emotional tranquility. The label "gap filler" thus tells
us little about how broad tort protection for nonphysical harms
should be or how courts should treat cases that clearly meet the
requisites of the outrage tort when there is also a remedy available
outside of tort law. Although the term "gap filler" might suggest a
minimal role for the infliction tort, that depends upon how large the
gap is perceived to be and whether the focus is on the contours and
scope of tort law or, rather, on the entire body of legal protection.
Because claims of harassment cannot be adequately addressed
within tort law without resort to the infliction claim, 5 4 and because
harassment results in serious injury that serves no socially useful
purpose, there is a potential gap in tort law to fill. The pressing
question becomes whether state courts will determine that
Termination Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1693, 1709-10 (1996).
352. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §
45 cmt. m ('Those matters, peculiar to a jurisdiction's statutory provisions, are left to local
law.").
353. See supra Part III.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 146-57.
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protecting individuals against discriminatory harms-like tort
protection against violence and fraud-is of sufficient importance
that it needs to be reinforced through state common law. Put
another way, courts are faced with a difficult question of whether
the concept of outrage can adequately perform the "important
normative work" 355 of signaling the most despicable types of
behavior if it remains divorced from principles of civil rights.
Because the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is
now firmly established in the law, there is no need to resort to civil
rights statutes to imply a new cause of action in tort. When a
harassment victim seeks tort relief against outrageous treatment
in the workplace, he or she is not asking the court to adopt a
common law remedy for a federal statutory violation,35 6 but
rather is invoking or borrowing civil rights concepts to inform
judicial understandings of outrageous behavior.35 v The migration of
civil rights law into tort law that this Article envisions is an
interpretive process by which courts selectively borrow from the
statutory domain to give more concrete meaning to tort standards.
The closest analogy may be to the judicial practice of borrowing
safety standards from statutes in negligence actions to concretize
the "reasonable person" standard under the negligence per se
doctrine.358 The underlying idea is that it is beneficial that statutory
norms find their way into tort law to insure that common law
adjudication reinforces legislative priorities and responds to
changing cultural sensibilities.
Once a determination is made that courts in tort actions may
appropriately borrow from civil rights, however, there remains the
difficult question of precisely which concepts should be borrowed
and how much overlap there should be between the two domains.
Taking a page from the negligence per se doctrine, an initial
355. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
356. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79-80 (1975).
357. See DOBBS, supranote 39, § 136, at 321-22 (discussing the adoption of federal statutes
in state-law torts). See generally Michael Traynor, Public Sanctions, PrivateLiability, and
JudicialResponsibility, 36 WILLAMETTEL. REv. 787 (2000) (discussing the difference between
implying a right of action and borrowing statutory norms).
358. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1,2005) (finding negligence per se if the actor violates a statute without excuse that
is designed to protect against "the type of accident the actor's conduct causes, and ... the
accident victim is within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect").
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question is whether courts should follow California's lead and adopt
a per se approach that automatically regards the creation of a
hostile environment actionable under civil rights law as outrageous
conduct in tort. 5 9 In such per se states, moreover, how should a
court approach a case of harassment that does not amount to a civil
rights violation because the ground for the harassment is not
covered under the statute, as in the case of harassment based on
language or sexual orientation?
Although there is something to be said for the simplicity of the
per se approach, I do not regard it as the most desirable approach
to migration. If one of the ultimate goals of migration is to reshape
basic concepts and norms in tort-and not simply to provide an
additional remedy for discrimination victims-selective borrowing
rather than wholesale incorporation of civil rights law seems
preferable. There is value in encouraging courts and litigants to
articulate just which aspects of a civil rights violation are crucial to
a tort determination of outrageous treatment of employees.
I would jettison the practice of searching for the unusual or
bizarre feature of a case that sets it apart from recurring hostile
environment cases, as some courts now do under the "gap filler"
approach. Instead, under a "mutually reinforcing" approach to
migration, courts should consider whether the defendant's conduct
should be classified as outrageous in part because it conforms to a
pattern common to civil rights violations, thus creating the
potential for cumulative harm of targeted victims and the continuation of persistent social inequalities. Under such an approach, that
the defendant's conduct amounted to a clear violation of civil rights
law would make it more likely that the plaintiff would satisfy the
threshold requirement of proof of outrageousness, but would not
guarantee recovery or even submission of the case to the jury. In
this respect, the approach is comparable to the "some evidence 36
of0
negligence" approach to statutory violations in negligence cases,
in that courts and juries in individual cases would still be called on
to make an independent determination of "outrageousness" focusing
on the totality of the evidence in the case. And, like the current

359. See supra note 50.
360. See DOBBS, supranote 39, § 134, at 316-17 (discussing "some evidence of negligence"
approach).
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process for trying negligence cases, such a flexible approach to the
infliction tort would have the virtue of promoting individualized
justice, with the downside of producing some unpredictable and
inconsistent results.
As discussed earlier, what I regard as the most innovative and
transportable aspects of civil rights law relate to three basic
features of the hostile environment claim.3 6 ' Because these three
features map quite easily onto current judicial approaches for
determining outrageousness, as described in the Restatement362 and
by tort scholars, 63 they can be absorbed into the mainstream of tort
law without much disruption.
The first feature places the focus of the claim on the dynamic
pattern of the defendant's behavior, rather than on discrete acts.
Looking to see whether the defendant's course of conduct over an
extended period created a "constructive" condition of work fits the
framework of the intentional infliction tort, which, in marked
contrast to torts like battery or assault, does not presuppose that
the specified injurious "conduct" can be fixed at a given point in
time. The hostile environment claim, like the infliction tort, allows
the plaintiff considerable leeway to select those events that
cumulatively amount to an oppressive environment, and the
opportunity to prove outrageousness by showing that the sum is
worse than its parts. Similar to the requirement in civil rights
litigation, in many torts cases the plaintiff will attempt to prove the
outrageous quality of the defendant's conduct by emphasizing its
severe or pervasive quality.
The second feature of the hostile environment claim that could
inform judicial determination of outrageous behavior is an inquiry
into the purpose and effect of the defendant's behavior.3 64 In civil
rights/hostile environment litigation, litigators are not restricted to
showing that the defendant's purpose was to inflict psychological
361. See supra text accompanying notes 314-24.
362. See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
363. See DOBBS, supra note 39, § 304, at 827; Givelber, supra note 11, at 52-54.
364. See the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's definition of a sexually hostile
environment, which focuses on both purpose and effect. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2004)
(describing "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature ... [which have] the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment").
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distress on the plaintiff or that the defendant's conduct had such an
effect. Instead, the inequality lens of civil rights litigation encourages plaintiffs to demonstrate that the hostile environment created
by the defendant also served some other harmful purpose, such as
discouraging the integration of male-dominated jobs or preserving
the character of a job as unsuitable for "outsiders" like the plaintiff.
This capacity of hostile environments to perpetuate existing
hierarchies in the workplace resembles the emphasis on exploiting
a power disparity between the parties, long noted as a marker of
outrageous behavior in infliction cases.36 5 Although civil rights law
has historically been more attuned than tort law to disparities
between social groups-rather than simply between individual
plaintiffs and defendants-there is no reason why courts could not
consider the social effects of defendants' conduct in making a
determination of outrageousness. Indeed, the migration of civil
rights norms to tort law depends on just such an infusion of a
group-based perspective.
Lastly, the feature of hostile environment litigation that potentially could have the greatest impact on determinations of outrageousness is the incorporation of perspective. As mentioned earlier,
courts in Title VII cases have begun to consider events from the
perspective of the target of the action, as well as from the perspective of the actor or a disinterested third party.3 6' This attempt to
look at a case from the perspective of a "reasonable person in the
plaintiffs position" often highlights salient individual characteristics of the plaintiff-such as gender and race-and focuses attention
on the impact of culturally significant factors, such as the plaintiffs
token status or the inferior position of her social group within the
particular organization. 6 7 In intentional infliction cases, courts
have often noted that "taking advantage of a plaintiff known to be
vulnerable" enhances the likelihood that the action will be deemed
outrageous.36 Civil rights law adds the important insight that
race, gender, and other markers of outsider status can operate as
vulnerabilities in the context of the workplace, especially as
experienced from the perspective of the targeted group.
365.
366.
367.
368.

See
See
See
See

supra note 46.
supra text accompanying notes 322-24.
supra note 323.
supra note 46.
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If not stunted by barriers such as preemption or the gap-filler
approach, each state can decide for itself the degree to which
concepts first developed under civil rights law should be universalized and brought into the mainstream of tort law. Leaving harassment and discrimination out of tort law strikes me as a bad idea
that artificially distorts the concept of "outrageous" conduct and
minimizes the importance of civil rights to individuals and to
society as a whole. Concerns that relate to the amount or type of
damages recoverable in such intentional infliction actions need not
defeat the claim, but can be addressed directly by allocation of
damages to the various claims.6 9 or though tort reform legislation
at the state level.
For quite some time, scholars in diverse fields have envisioned a
core concept of individual dignity that would find expression in
every area of law, guaranteeing freedom from torture, humiliation,
and outrage. My hope is that courts will allow the migration process
from civil rights to torts to proceed so that a more concrete and
contemporary understanding of dignitary harm can emerge in tort
law, divorced from antiquated notions of honor and status. The tort
of outrage should be more than just a repository for the bizarre; it
should mark the place where the law struggles to define and
redefine the meaning of decency, humanity, and equality.

369. For example, to prevent double recovery, courts have exercised their discretion to
develop methods for allocating damages to state and federal claims when both are presented.
See Channon v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 850 (Iowa 2001); see also Sharkey,
supra note 9, at 40-43 (discussing allocating jury awards between federal and state claims
and between compensatory and punitive damages).

